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Pollution does not respect international boundaries. This
simple fact has created a multitude of problems in the past half
century because burgeoning industrialization has increased the
probability that nations will injure each other through the medium
of shared natural resources. But treating every private injury by
trans-boundary pollution as an international tort will do little to
further the cause of harmony among nations. The policy underlying the customary requirement that injured parties exhaust all
local remedies before seeking governmental assistance' is particularly well suited to this situation since the offensive activity will
often be located in the same ecological region as, and in proximity
to, the injured party.'
The importance of dealing with pollution problems regionally, by tailoring specific preventive, regulatory or remedial measures to the air or watersheds concerned, is well recognized. 3 Most
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1. See 8 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 769-76 (1967).
2. But see N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1970, § 1, at 24, col. 1, describing a
"black snow" caused by combustion pollutants which fell on Norway and Sweden
and was believed to have originated in the Ruhr Valley in Germany. See also
Sweden's case study for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Air Pollution Across National Boundaries: The Impact on the Environment of Sulphur in Air and Precipitation 19 (1971) for findings that sulphur
emitted into the air has a mean residence period of two to four days and may
travel one thousand kilometers.
3. See, e.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(a)(1), 1857c-2
(a)(2), and 1857d(d)(1)(D) (Supp. V, 1970); Angelo, Protection of the Hu-
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modern national pollution-control and resource management programs are organized on a regional basis, rather than along the
lines of political boundaries,4 and a number of international agreeents have been concluded to protect neighboring nations' interests in shared resources.5 But these agreements generally do not
create remedial mechanisms for private injuries suffered through
pollution of the shared resources. A boundary line which follows a river channel or bisects a valley can thus constitute an insurmountable jurisdictional barrier to a private citizen's efforts to
obtain relief from pollution originating within his own ecological
region. 6 In practice, citizens have sought to have their claims settled through governmental channels when borders prevented assertion of jurisdictional power over the offensive activity. 7 But
man Environment-First Steps Toward Regional Cooperation in Europe, 5 INT'L
LAw. 511 (1971); Adinolfi, First Steps Toward European Cooperation in Reducing Air Pollution-Activities of the Council of Europe, 33 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 421 (1968); "Pollution Defies Europe's Borders", N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1970; Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality,
Part 11: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432

(1966).
4. See Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
828 (1963):
A single river may be subject to many incompatible claims and uses,
and when it flows from state to state, it creates a natural as well as an
economic interdependence among riparian states. Moreover, the fact
that "international boundaries were often drawn without consideration
of the requirements for sound water administration," [Integrated River
Basin Development, U.N. ECOSOC Council Report 32 (E/3066)
(1958).] aggravates the possibility of conflict.
5. See the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No.
548 (effective May 13, 1910) [hereinafter cited and referred to as 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, or 1909 Treaty], and the following treaties which, like the
Boundary Waters Treaty, formed commissions which deal with water pollution
problems on a regional basis: Convention of 27 October 1960 between Baden,
Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Austria and Switzerland, establishing the Commission for
the Protection of Waters of Lake Constance; the Convention of 16 November
1962 between Switzerland and France, establishing the Commission for the Protection of Waters of Lake Leman; The Commission of the Saar and the Moselle
Prot. of 1 July 1962 between France and the Federal Republic of Germany; and
the Agreement of 29 April 1963 between the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, in force since 1 May
1965, establishing The International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine
from Pollution.
6. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
7. For a discussion of how private claims of United States citizens
against a smelter in Canada were converted "into claims sounding in international tort by the United States against Canada," see Read, The Trail Smelter
Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 222-23 (1963).
A general description of
pre-settlement adjudication techniques can be found in Re, The Foreign Claims
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seeking remedies from a foreign government instead of taking recourse directly against the party responsible for the damage is

needlessly circuitous and burdensone.8 Moreover, even if a private claim is espoused' by the injured citizen's national government it may become embroiled in controversies over invasion of
his country's sovereignty and responsibility of the polluter's country in international law."0 The delicacy of such disputes is increased by the desire of states to protect their national domain
from damage occasioned through shared natural resources. 1 '
Both the First International Parliamentary Conference on
the Environment 2 and the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment" have recognized the need for attention to this
area by specifically resolving to develop possibilities for redress of
private injury suffered from trans-boundary pollution. The very
fact that the nations represented at these high-level meetings have
Settlement Commission: Its Functions and Jurisdiction, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 1079
(1962); and Re, International Claims Adjudication: The United States-Canadian
Agreement, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 125 (1968).
8. Washington State citizens waited thirteen years before recovering compensation for damage caused by a smelter in British Columbia in the Trail
Smelter Dispute. See Read, supra note 7.
9. See 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 1217, regarding governmental espousal and settlement of citizens' claims. See also article 23 of the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, in
Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of
Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 579 (1961); and see note 219 infra.
10. For analyses of state responsibility for pollution, see authorities cited in
note 344 infra. The recent controversy between the United States and Canada
over the Cherry Point oil spill, in which the two countries differed as to the
responsibility of a state for the acts of its citizens, illustrates this uncertainty.
Notes exchanged by Canada and the United States of June 28, 1972 and
July 12, 1972, respectively, on file with the California Western International
Law Journal.
11. See The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
12. Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, June 2-4, 1971. See the Conference Resolution at p. 7:
A study should be made of the legal means open to persons having
suffered damage caused by harmful environmental activities originating
in another country to bring legal action against those responsible for
these activities.
(From a pamphlet available from the Interparlamentarische Arbeitsgemeinschaft,
5300 Bonn, Adenauerallee 214, Germany.)
13. Stockholm, Sweden, June 5-16, 1972. See the Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment on June 16, 1972, principle 22, A/CONF. 48/14 and corr. 1.
See note 346 infra. This principle was specifically endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly, G.A. Res. 2996, 27th sess., Dec. 15, 1972.
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called for such an effort indicates that a significant number of
unremedied pollution injuries have been brought to the attention
of governmental bodies-and it is quite likely that the complaints
reaching the governmental level are only the "tip of the iceberg."
Although the area of private remedies for injuries sustained
through the medium of boundary natural resources is by no means
unfamiliar to the United States and Canada, it is shrouded in uncertainty. This article will undertake to clear the air partially by
examining possibilities for Canadian and United States citizens to
bring actions against extraterritorial sources of pollution. The
focus will be upon whether and how a plaintiff can get into court,
and not upon whether his action will succeed. Thus, the discussion will concentrate upon aspects of establishing personal and

subject matter jurisdiction which appear potentially problematic,
but will not deal with issues such as proof of causation which are
common to all environmental lawsuits and have been dealt with
Theories upon which plaintiff could
extensively elsewhere."4
14. Once the jurisdictional hurdle is cleared, proof of causation may constitute the most imposing obstacle to a successful action. The potential difficulty
of establishing a causal connection between a source of water pollution in one
country and an injury in the other is discussed in Landis, Legal Controls of
Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin, 48 CAN. B. REV. 66, 129-32 (1970).
However, the same techniques for easing proof burdens would be available to
the litigant that have been helpful in wholly domestic situations. One of these is
res ipsa loquitur, which has been applied in pollution cases to permit an inference of negligence. See California, by and through its Department of Fish and
Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 318 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840
See generally Comment, The 4pplication of Res Ipsa Loquitur in
(1958).
The docSuits 4lainst Multiple Defendants, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 106 (1969).
trine of negligence per se allows statutory standards to be used to establish a

standard of conduct under certain conditions.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

§ 286 (1965).
Since a single pollution injury is often caused by independent but concurring acts of multiple defendants (and this would seem especially true in a trans-boundary situation), establishment of joint liability is desirable. Defendants may be held jointly and severally liable where all can be
joined. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931);
Harper-Turner Oil Co. v. Bridge, 311 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1957); and W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (3d ed. 1964). Or the burden of proof
may be shifted to defendants to show what portion of the damage each caused
under the doctrine of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
This rule was applied in a water pollution case in Landers v. East Texas Salt
See RESTATEMENT
Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
On proof of causation in pollution suits
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
generally, see, e.g., Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 429, 453-56 (1971); Baxter, The SST:
From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-53 (1968);
TORTS
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ground his action and available defenses as well as remedies' will
be considered only where pertinent to a particular jurisdictional
inquiry. It is perhaps appropriate, however, to note at the outset

that respect for sovereign rights may severely restrict available
relief in some actions to abate or indemnify trans-boundary
pollution injury. Apart from problems of supervision, a court may
be reluctant to grant injunctive relief because of the possibility that
such would be viewed as an attempt to impose regulations on a
foreign activity and as an improper interference with the economic
affairs of the foreign state. 16 A court may simply refuse to grant
such relief, or may demonstrate its indisposition by weighting the
7
scales heavily in favor of the defendant in "balancing the equities."'
Further, national sovereignty will impose limitations on adjustment of the parties' rights whenever a "right to pollute" is involved. Such a right could be alleged to exist prescriptively by
the defendant,' 8 or created judicially by an award of "permanent
Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IowA
L. REV. 186, 196-200 (1966); and Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung
Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 17
(1966).
15. These aspects of environmental litigation have received considerable
attention. See generally, J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights,
1967 DUKE L.J. 1126 (1967); Rheingold, supra note 14; Seamans, Tort Liability
for Pollution of Air and Water, 3 NAT. RES. LAW. 146 (1970); Note, Private
Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970); and Note, A
Trend Toward Coalesence of Trespass and Nuisance: Remedy for Invasion of
Particulates,1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 62 (1961).
16. Cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d
Cir. 1956):
We realize that a court of equity having personal jurisdiction over a
party has power to enjoin him from committing acts elsewhere. But
this power should be exercised with great reluctance when it will be
difficult to secure compliance with any resulting decree or when the exercise of such power is fraught with possibilities of discord and conflict
with the authorities of another country.
(footnotes omitted).
17. This practice is a traditional nemesis of environmental lawsuits in
wholly domestic polluter-receptor contexts. See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper and Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904), and
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) for cases denying
injunctive relief by balancing the equities in favor of defendants. For a more
judicious application of the doctrine see Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226
F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963). See generally Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities", 18 TEx. L. REV. 412 (1940); and Comment, Equity and
the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1254 (1970).
18. Because a statute of limitations had run, a prescriptive right was found
to exist "to manufacture the maximum quantity of cement produced annually by
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damages imposing a servitude on the land."' 9
A study of actions stemming from pollution which crosses the
boundary between Canada and the United States cannot ignore
events at the beginning of the century which have left a legacy of
doubt concerning private transnational disputes over natural resource use. Questions between the two countries regarding shared
natural resources led to the conclusion in 1909 of a treaty2" which
included a critical provision on private remedies. One of the principle drafters of the treaty, Chandler P. Anderson, 21 explained
what this provision accomplished:
[T]he treaty proceeds to establish a new rule for the benefit
and protection of those interests, on either side of the boundary, which might be injuriously affected by the use or diversion of such waters on the other side of the boundary, there
being, under existing conditions no remedies or redress in
22
such cases.
Whatever necessitated this "new rule" to allow redress for use
and diversion injuries would presumably constitute an impediment
to actions for trans-boundary pollution injuries as well. A necessary prologue to analysis of jurisdictional possibilities is therefore
an examination of why remedies were deemed unavailable without the provision and whether they remain unavailable.
After briefly reviewing some of the distinctive features of
transnational pollution and actions to remedy its effects, attention
will be directed first to the above-discussed private remedies provision, and next to jurisdictional issues raised by suits at the place
[a] factory" in Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Company, 16 Cal. 239, 244,
118 P. 928, 930 (1911).

19. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1970). A
smelter in British Columbia was unable to acquire a smoke easement from landowners in the State of Washington because "the Constitution of the State of
Washington provided that no alien person or corporation could hold interests
in land in the State." Read, supra note 7, at 223.
20. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions
Arising Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat 2448
(1910), T.S. No. 548 (effective May 13, 1910).
21. Professor Jessup has characterized Mr. Anderson's role as follows:
On the American side, the real negotiator, the man who worked out
every point of detail, was Chandler P. Anderson. His service was not
as a mere assistant, but a strong co-adjudicator of independent contacts
with the representatives of other powers.
2 P. JESSuP & EL1ui ROOT, 97-98 (1938).
22. Draft press release prepared for Secretary
Knox, in Chandler P.
Anderson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, quoted in Scott, The
Canadian-American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article H1?, 36 CAN. B. REv.
511, 518 n.15 (1958) (emphasis added).
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of defendant's activity and at the place where plaintiff was allegedly injured.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Canada and the United States share a boundary approximately 3500 miles long, 23 which cuts through "2000 miles of
mostly navigable waters, 2 4 including two of the world's major
international drainage basins, the Columbia and the St. Lawrence.25 The Great Lakes alone are the largest bodies of fresh
water in the world, 26 containing about one fourth of the world's
fresh water supply. 27 Reflecting the important function of fresh
water in fostering the growth of civilization,2 8 the Great Lakes
2
region presently supports a population in excess of 40 million 1
and about one fifth of United States and one half of Canadian
economic activity.30 This concentration of population and industry around such bountiful shared water resources has inevitably
produced an enormous amount of trans-boundary air and water
pollution. The present sorrowful state of the Great Lakes' water
quality is well known,3 1 and Lake Erie's advanced state of eutrophication has prompted the suggestion that it resembles a cesspool more than a lake, is beyond rehabilitation, and should be
drained in order to create new recreational areas, farms and
cities.3 2 Boundary air pollution was already a serious problem in
23. Papers of the I.J.C. 101, quoted in 3 M. WHITEMAN,
722 (1964).
24. Id.

DIGEST OF INTER-

NATIONAL LAW

25. White, A Perspective of River Basin Development, 22 L. &

CoNTEMP.

PRon. 157, 185 (1957).
26. RITTER,

TRANSPORTATION

ECONOMICS OF THE GREAT LAKEs-ST.

LAW-

(1925).
27. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United StatesCanadian Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Boasson, Sociological Excursions Along International Rivers,
in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 52, at 53 (on file at the Environmental Law Centre,

RENCE SHIP CANAL 11

International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN), 5300 Bonn, Adenauerallee 214, Federal Republic of Germany).
29. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM., CANADA AND UNITED STATES, POLLUTION
OF LAKE

ERIE, LAKE

LAWRENCE RIVER

ONTARIO AND

THE

INTERNATIONAL

17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as IJC 1970

SECTION

OF THE ST.

REPORT].

30. Bilder, supra note 27, at 474.

31. See, e.g.,

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT

29-59 (1970); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
99-153 (1971); IJC 1970 REPORT, supra note 29; and Hill, The Great and Dirty
Lakes, in CONTROLLING POLLUTION 43 (Goldman ed. 1967).
32. Young, Pulling the Plug on Lake Erie: A Modest Proposal, HARPERS,
August, 1972, at 48.
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the 1920's3 3 and has provoked increasing governmental con-

cem since that time.34
The special problems created by such transnational pollution
may be illustrated as follows: by its nature, a polluting, or resource-deteriorating activity will eventually foreclose a nondeteriorating activity 35 in the absence of corrective action from either the
public 6 or private 7 sector. It is especially difficult to bring such
incentives to bear upon polluters in a transnational context, since
the cost to society3" of the polluter's activity-in terms of dirty
water or air-will often be imposed on the other side of the border. To the extent that jurisdictional problems impede governmental efforts at coordinated regulation" and prevent victims

from obtaining legal redress against foreign polluters,40 priorities
33. For a history of the Trail Smelter controversy, which began in 1928,
see Read, supra note 7; and The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905
(1941); 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
34. See the authorities cited in notes 200-203 and accompanying text infra.
35. [T]he contrary cannot hold true. In short, the polluter's use can
stop the swimmer from using and enjoying a lake, but the swimmer's
use cannot stop the polluter from polluting the lake.
Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 105, 107 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970).
36. For an analysis of possibilities for governmental action see Krier, supra
note 14.

37. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 15; and Note, Private Remedies for
Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970).
38. The cost to society, or "social cost" is the price which the polluter
avoids paying for his free use of air or water as a garbage receptacle. For discussions of the "social costs" imposed upon receptors by pollution sources see,
e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Kapp,
Social Costs of Business Enterprise, in CONTROLLINO POLLUTION 82 (Goldman ed.
1967); and Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 227 (1968). Although most pollution-control laws still fail to
put a price upon the use of air and water as means of waste disposal, and thus
to force industry to bear an appropriate portion of the social costs associated
with such waste disposal, it has been suggested that the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments do not eliminate the possibility of enacting emission fees.

See

section 110 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857p-5 (1970);
EPA Reg. § 420.1(n)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 15487 (1971) regarding "emission
charges or taxes or other economic incentives or disincentives." For discussions
of effluent fees in general, see, e.g., Wolozin, id.; Delogu, Effluent Charges:
A Method of Enforcing Stream Standards, 19 ME. L. REV. 29 (1967); and
Comment, The Effluent Fee Approach for Controlling Air Pollution, 1970
DUKE L.J. 943 (1970).
39. The jurisdictional complexity of border pollution control programs is
discussed in Bilder, supra note 27, at 478. See also Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5 OTrAWA L. REV. 65, 80 (1971).
40. Authorities have been of the opinion that such redress was impossible.
See text accompanying notes 182-183 infra.
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among competing users of water and air resources shared by Canadian and American 4 1 citizens will be determined simply by the
preemption of nonconsuming uses by consuming uses. While cooperative efforts by the two nations to control trans-boundary
pollution have received considerable attention,4 the utility of private recourse against foreign pollution sources as a means of
achieving balanced resource use has been largely ignored."' In
addition to serving remedial purposes, actions seeking redress for
such pollution injuries would serve to complement governmental
efforts at regional regulation.
Unlike many other environmental problems which have only
recently been formally recognized, trans-boundary water pollution-perhaps because of its international character-was already
the subject of joint United States-Canadian concern at the beginning of the century. The Treaty relating to Boundary Waters and
Questions arising along the Boundary between Canada and the
United States"4 was concluded by the United States and Great
Britain in 1909 in order
to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters
and to settle all questions which are now pending between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the
rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the
other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their common
frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settle41. For convenience, "American" is used in this paper to refer to the
United States.
42. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 27; Jordan, supra note 39; Rempe, International Air Pollution-United States and Canada-A Joint Approach, 10 ARIz.
L. REV. 138 (1968); and Comment, Pollution of the Great Lakes: A Joint Approach by Canada and the United States, 2 CALIF. WEST. INT'L L.J. 109 (1971).
43. The private action is uniquely suited to attacking international pollution: aside from allowing indemnification, it can achieve directly-albeit not
comprehensively-what is often difficult to accomplish through joint governmental programs, and will avoid the impediments involved in coordinating two
regulatory systems. Because of this tactical advantage, private recourse by pollution victims directly against polluters would appear to be a particularly effective
method of producing a more equitable balance between resource-deteriorating
and non-deteriorating uses on the international level, and of forcing pollution
sources to assume a larger portion of the costs to society created by their
activities. On the use of litigation to internalize pollution costs see generally
Krier, supra note 14, ,at 444-49; Comment, The Cost Internalization Case for
Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969); Baxter, supra note 14; and Katz,
The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV.
587 (1969).
44. 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548 (effective May 13, 1910).
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ment of all such questions as may hereafter arise. .... 45
Although it was concerned primarily with diversion and naviga-

tion of boundary waters, the 1909 Treaty embodied an explicit
46 It
prohibition against harmful trans-boundary water pollution.
established the International Joint Commission of the United
States and Canada (IJC)4 7 which was endowed with judicial,4 8
investigative, 49 administrative 0 and arbitral 5 ' powers to facilitate
settlement of questions covered by the treaty. One of the first
questions referred by the American and Canadian governments
to the IJC concerned the condition of boundary waters, with particular reference to the causes and extent of boundary waters pollution. 52 The Commission thoroughly investigated conditions in
the United States and Canada for six years and found that with
the single but short-lived exception of the Great Lakes beyond their
shores,
[t]he entire stretch of boundary waters, including Rainy
River, St. Mary's River, St. Clair River, Detroit River, Niagara River, St. Lawrence River from Lake Ontario to Cornwall and the St. John River . . . is polluted to an extent

drinkwhich renders the water in its unpurified state unfit for
53
ing.

..

and.

.

. in

direct contravention of the treaty.

The IJC recommended that it be given additional powers to deal
with this situation but, although the two governments did consider
a draft treaty conferring such powers, their negotiations never bore
fruit.54
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
ld.,

preamble.
art. IV.
art. VII.
art. VIII.
art. IX.
art. VI.
art. X.

52. IJC, FINAL REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS 5 (1918).
Article IV's prohibition of trans-boundary pollution provides a jurisdictional
basis for pollution references to the IJC under article IX of the 1909 Treaty.
53. Id., at 51.
54. The draft treaty submitted by the International Joint Commission
to both governments in 1920 which would have empowered the Commission to
investigate and determine the sources of pollution on its own initiative was
never adopted despite initial interest on both sides. I.J.C., supra note 52; I.J.C.
File No. 4-5-1:1; Jordan, supra note 39, at 68-69.

Further, although an inter-

governmental conference on the Great Lakes environment attended by the Ontario government and the eight basin state governors agreed on a substantially

expanded role for the IJC, [see "Strengthening of Role for I.J.C. Agreed as Aid
in Pollution Fight," Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 11, 1970, at 1-2.] the
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Despite early awareness of boundary pollution problems, the
intensified demands of growth and development far outstripped
any efforts at abatement and control. The prevailing social milieu
of economic and industrial ferment, 55 nurtured by a governmental
policy climate favoring economic expansion, allowed a steady escalation of trans-boundary pollution" notwithstanding the express
prohibition of article IV of the 1909 Treaty. 57 It is to be hoped
1972 Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great
Lakes Water Quality, [T.I.A.S. No. 7312 (effective April 15, 1972).] while
authorizing the IJC to tender advice and recommendations and undertake coordinating activities, failed to endow the Commission with sufficient powers to
make it a truly independent body.
55. In the Western Hemisphere . . . the smooth adjustment to industrial exploitation of all the available resources-with amazing technical
skill-may have grievously lacked the required foresight. It seems that
not enough heed has been given to safeguard the amenities for
future generations.
Boasson, supra note 28, at 59-60. Illustrative of the economic-determinism
mentality are these words from Judge Musmanno, written in 1935:
While smoke per se is objectionable and adds nothing to the outer
aesthetics of any community, it is not without its connotational beauty
as it rises in clouds from smoke stacks of furnaces and ovens (and even
gob fires) telling the world that the fires of prosperity are burning,the fires that assure economic security to the workingman, as well as
establish profitable returns on capital legitimately invested.
Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 379,
384 (1935). See also McCoY, SAVING OUR WILDLIFE (1970) for a discussion
of the relationship between the social and industrial history of North America
and unenlightened natural resource policy.
56. While resource-exploitation policies held sway, a phenomenon aptly
termed "The Tragedy of the Commons" [see Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 31 (De Bell ed. 1970).] accounted
for extensive resource deterioration. This theory explains why free availability
of shared air and water resources, coupled with economic competition, leads
inevitably to the exhaustion of those resources in the absence of regulation or
effective conflict resolution procedures.
Treating natural resources as "free
goods" [see note 38, supra.] makes polluting economically advantaegous because an industry's share of the social cost created by releasing its untreated
wastes into the "commons" is far less than the cost it would incur by purifying
its effluents before releasing them. The problem is exacerbated in international
situations:
The "tragedy of the commons" which allows much of the globe to lie
free for despoliation, reflects the lack of a customary international law
to . .. protect through law processes the people and territory of one nation from ecological depredation by others.
Angelo, supra note 3, at 518.
57. Indeed, the mechanisms provided by the 1909 Treaty for the orderly
governmental settlement of boundary resource conflicts may have had the effect
of submerging problems upon which ad hoc private and governmental dispute
settlement procedures would have focused attention. Consider the following observation:
Whereas it is true that we need more international law for the solution
of overt conflict, yet the strife between quarreling populations may
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-and indeed presumed, on the basis of governmental policy pronouncements 5 8-that the problems engendered by such a philosophy have now been at least acknowledged.
But the advent of an "environmental consciousness" does
not mean restoration of the status quo ante pollution, and even an
effective regulatory system cannot prevent all private injury. It
is therefore important that the existence of a boundary between a
polluting activity and those it affects does not operate to preclude
relief, or to transform a dispute capable of settlement through an
ordinary private legal proceeding into an international controversy.
These ideas were expressed in article II of the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty, where the Canadian and United States governments endorsed the general policy of reconciling private disputes
concerning shared natural resources through the courts.59 While
pollution crossing the boundary is now the major point of concern, depletion caused by diversion of water in the upstream country was the principal source of controversy when the 1909 Treaty
was concluded. These two classes of natural resource disputes
are closely analogous in that they involve similar policy considerations and raise many of the same legal issues. Canadian-American experience with diversion problems will therefore be reviewed
to ascertain the purpose of including the private remedies provision
occasionally be less harmful than the misplaced stress on increased exploitation without adequate conservation.
Boasson, supra note 28, at 60.

Although economic determinism may be thought to be a thing of the past,
current American governmental policy is criticized in ZwlCK & BENSTOCK, WATER
WASTELAND (1972) for failing to impose water pollution control measures on
state and local governments. The authors view this failure as a result of the
enormous political influence of polluters over the Federal Government, which
exceeds the influence of the majority of the population suffering from water

pollution.
58. See, e.g., the United States National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
59. This philosophy is reflected in article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty. Secretary of State Elihu Root made the following statement before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1909 concerning article II's provision

for reciprocal rights in case of diversion injuries:
If our use of the Milk River injures those settlers down there they
have their recourse and their rights can be protected in the American
courts instead of becoming a great international question and having all
of the people in Canada take an interest in it. It simply becomes a
question of litigation before the courts instead of an international question.

Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 271 (Jan., Feb.,
1909).
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and to create a background for consideration of jurisdictional issues in pollution suits.

II.

THi PRIVATE REMEDIES PROVISION OF THE 1909 TREATY

Most natural resource problems arising along the CanadianAmerican boundary have been dealt with under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty or through the International Joint Commission
which the Treaty created. Although air and water pollution problems have recently received much attention, the two problem areas
upon which the 1909 Treaty focuses are navigation and diversion
of waters along and flowing across the boundary. Accordingly,
the only specific reference to private remedies in the 1909 Treaty
is found in article II which authorizes free use and diversion of
inland waters but creates private rights of action for extraterritorial
injuries caused by such diversions. The only explicit mention of
pollution in the Treaty appears in article IV, which prohibits pollution of all shared water resources causing trans-boundary injury,
but says nothing about private remedies in the event such injury
should occur. Transnational diversion and pollution cases are
closely analogous in that both involve an activity causing extraterritorial injury through the medium of natural resources. So any
jurisdictional obstruction to relief in diversion cases would presumably be present in pollution cases.
Article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty provides:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or
to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on the other as the case
may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with
respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over
the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of
all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural
channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary
waters; but it is agreed that any interference with or diversion
from their natural channel of such waters on either side of
the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of
the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle
the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs .... 60
60. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548
(effective May 13, 1910), art. H.
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No suits have been brought under this provision; 61 the question
of whether it is actually effective to allow injured parties to sue
in the other country has been debated extensively 2 and will not
be considered here. It will suffice for the present inquiry to de-

termine whether the factor necessitating a special provision for
private remedies in diversion cases would be present in pollution
cases as well. The portion of the article preceding the semicolon
states the American position in 1909, as represented by the "Harmon doctrine,"6 that restricting a nation's use of inland waters
61. Letter from John Crook, Counsel for the United States Section of the
International Joint Commission and Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, November 10, 1972, on file with the California Western
InternationalLaw Journal.
62. See, e.g., Austin, Canadian-United States Practice und Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and
Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REV. 393 (1959); Bourne, The
Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. B. REv. 444 (1959); Cohen, Some Legal and
Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute, 36 CAN. B. REV. 25 (1958);
Griffin, Problems Respecting the Availability of Remedies in Cases Relating to
the Uses of International Rivers, 51 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 36 (1957); Scott,
supra note 22; and Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy Over the
Columbia River, 41 U. WASH. L. REV. 676 (1966).
63. See 21 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 274, 281-82 (1895). The doctrine has been
stated as follows:
[T]here is no duty or obligation in international law on any state to
restrain its use of the waters within its territory to accommodate the
needs of another state. Jurisdiction and control of a state over the waters of an international river wholly in its territory is exclusive.
Austin, supra note 62, at 408. It was not long until the validity of this proposition as a general principle of international law was disputed [see OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 175 (1st ed. 1905-06).] and even American officials grew
doubtful as nationalistic sentiment of the early 20th century subsided. See
testimony of Benedict English, Legal Advisor to the United States Department
of State, that "there is, to say the least, considerable doubt regarding the soundness of the Harmon opinion ..... " in Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on the Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Utilization of
the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1745 (1945); Martin,
The Diversion of Columbia River Waters, 51 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 2, 5
(1957): "It can hardly be contended, then, in support of the literal interpretation and absolute application of Article II, that the United States is now a
champion of the Harmon doctrine."; W. Griffin, Attorney, Office of the Legal
Adviser, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, Memorandum, Department of State, 21 April 1958, S.Doc. 118, 85th Cong., 2d sess.,
quoted in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 23; at 939-42 (1964), stating that principles of customary international law governing international waters involve a
combination of the doctrine of sovereignty over inland waters and the riparian
doctrine of equitable apportionment; Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1018, 1020-21 (1955), concluding that the
applicable principle is the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. The
United States government even went so far as to repudiate the validity of the
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to prevent extraterritorial injuries would be inconsistent with
states' sovereign rights to their natural resources. The second
part, included at the behest of Canada, is apparently concerned
with availability of private redress for injuries caused by uses
justifiable under the first part. Yet for reasons discussed below it
is not altogether clear how, or even whether, the two elements of
article II are related. If the second part provides for remedies for
"use and diversion" injuries because the first part was thought to
preclude such remedies, a provision for pollution remedies would be
unnecessary since the "use and diversion" allowed in article II
clearly does not include pollution, which is proscribed by article
IV. But if Canada deemed article H's private remedies provision
necessary to allow suits against American diverters, the absence
of a comparable provision for pollution cases may mean that transnational suits by pollution victims would not be possible under the
provisions of the Treaty.
In order to establish just what the second part of article IE
was intended to do for injured parties, it is necessary to know what
rights they would have in its absence. Since the remedial provision is counterposed in that article with an explicit implementation
of the Harmon doctrine, a brief historical excursion may provide some insight as to the influence of the political climate in which
Attorney General Harmon rendered his opinion upon remedial
possibilities.
A.

Historical Factors

In the latter part of the 19th century, a controversy arose
over diversions of water from the Rio Grande by farmers and
ranchers in Colorado and New Mexico which caused a reduction in
the water supply available to Mexican communities in the vicinity
of Ciudad Juarez. 4 This situation culminated in October, 1895,
Harmon doctrine during the Columbia River diversion controversy with Canada,
submitted to the International Joint Commission for investigation and recommendations pursuant to article IX of the 1909 Treaty: "The United States has
never, in practice, followed the Harmon Doctrine embodied in Article II of the

treaty. Moreover, that doctrine is not, today, a principle of general international
law." L BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

168 (1958).

64. For a thorough description of the United States-Mexico boundary
problems of this period, see Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the
United States and Mexico, 17 TEX. L. REV. 27 (1939). See also Austin, supra

note 62, at 405-11. For an analysis of the technical and legal repercussions of
the water quality problem as it exists today between the two countries see Com-
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when the Mexican Minister to the United States sent a letter of
protest to the U.S. Secretary of State. The Mexican Minister
claimed that the Americans' actions violated not only two treaties
but also principles of international law, the Mexican inhabitants'
claim "being prior to that of the inhabitants of Colorado by hundreds of years, and according to the principles of civil law, a prior
For a legal apclaim takes precedence in case of dispute."6
praisal of the Mexican position the Secretary of State turned to
Attorney General Judson Harmon. In response to a question
whether under principles of international law Mexico was entitled to indemnity for harm suffered from the diversions, Attorney General Harmon delivered a landmark opinion, in which he
stated as follows:
[I]t is evident that what is really contended for is a servitude
which makes the lower country dominant and subjects the
upper country to the burden of arresting its development and
denying to its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature
has supplied entirely within its own territory.
. . .The fundamental principle of international law is the
absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others,
within its own territory. Of the nature and scope of sovereignty with respect to judicial jurisdiction, which is one of
its elements, Chief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Exchange
v. McFadden, 1 Cranch, p. 136): "The jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to
the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
"All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories must be traced
up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source."6 6
ment, Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United States Water Quality Dilemma, 3
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 152 (1972-73).

65. Matias Romero, Mexican Minister, to Richard Olney, Secretary of
State, Oct. 21, 1895, AMERICAN AND BRITISH CLAIMS ARBITRATION, No. 83:
THE Rio GRANDE CLAIM, APPENDIX TO THE ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES 200,
202 (1923), quoted in Simsarian, supra note 64, at 32.
Although this position was
66. 21 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 274, 281-82 (1895).
adopted by the United States to defeat Mexico's claim based upon prior rights, in
a later dispute with Canada over a proposed diversion by the latter country of
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But the Attorney General went on to emphasize that his opinion
was formulated only according to principles of international law
and did not include foreign policy considerations:
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances make it possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity is a question which does not pertain to
the Department [of Justice]; but that question should be decided as one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the
rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose
67
no liability or obligation upon the United States.
On the basis of these conclusions, the State Department informed
the Mexican Minister that the United States government was under no duty to halt the diversions in Colorado and New Mexico.
Therefore, the United States was not liable in damages for the injured agricultural operations of Ciudad Juarez-a city whose people had enjoyed the use of the Rio Grande for irrigation of their
68
land for more than 300 years.
Both the Harmon opinion and the resultant State Department
communiqu6, 6 9 pregnant as they are with the language of absolute
sovereignty, strongly reflect the pervasive nationalistic atmosphere
which prevailed in the country at the turn of the century. It is
worthy of note, however, that what the United States was not
prepared to concede on strict international legal grounds, it was
apparently willing to settle through diplomatic negotiations proceeding not according to accepted principles of international law
but from "the high principles of equity and. . . the friendly sentiments which should exist between good neighbors."7
And alColumbia River waters, the United States asserted virtually the same theory in

its own behalf. It argued, inter alia, that "under the doctrine of 'prior appropriation', since the United States has been first in use of the waters, it has a right to
their permanent use ......
L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 63,
at 46.
67. 21 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 274, 282 (1895).
The State Department advised
the Mexican Minister as follows on the basis of the Harmon opinion:
[T]he rules of international law imposed upon the United States no
duty to deny to its inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the
Rio Grande lying wholly within the United States, the supposition of the
existence of such a duty being inconsistent with the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States over the national domain.
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, H.R. Doc. No. 551, 56th Cong., 2d
Sess. vol. I, at 654 (1906).
68. Matias Romero to Richard Olney, supra note 65.
69. See note 67 supra.
70. Reply of Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, to Frederico Gainboa, Mexican Charge d'Affaires ad interim, May 1, 1905, quoted in Simsarian,
supra note 64, at 43.
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though the State Department twice reaffirmed 71 the "non-liability
of the United States government for the claims for indemnity
brought forward by Mexico .... -72 the two governments, after
protracted negotiations, did enter into a treaty in 1906 7 recognizing each country's right to an equitable apportionment of the wa74
ters of the Rio Grande.
But the treaty made no provision for the settlement of individual damage claims-which official Mexican estimates placed
as high as $12,845,000 as of 1897-and in fact provided in article
IV that in consideration for the delivery of an agreed-upon amount
of water, Mexico
declares fully settled and disposed of, and hereby waives, all
claims heretofore asserted or existing, or that may hereafter
arise, or be asserted, against the United States.

.

. by reason

of the diversion by citizens of the United States of waters
75
of the Rio Grande.
This provision would seem entirely consistent with the Harmon
doctrine in foreclosing injured Mexicans from seeking compensation from the United States government through espousal of their
claims by their own government.
The Harmon opinion thus purported to concern only the liability of the United States government according to principles of
public international law and said nothing about the right of injured Mexican citizens to seek relief in United States courts directly against the American diverters. Applying this interpreta71. See id., and Secretary of State Elihu Root to Joaquin D. Casasus,
Mexican Ambassador, Dec. 19, 1905, quoted in Simsarian, supra note 64, at 44.
72. See Mr. Adee to Mr. Gamboa, supra note 70.
73. Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of
the Waters Thereof, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455 [hereinafter referred to as 1906 Treaty with Mexico]
74. Id., preamble. This treaty,
reflected the prevailing attitude of the United States that though in
international law they could withdraw the complete flow, in terms of
international comity they were willing to provide Mexico with water
equivalent to that which she had used before the diversion took place.
Austin, supra note 62, at 409.
75. 1909 Treaty with Mexico, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455, art. IV. To
eradicate any possible doubt as to U.S. motivations for concluding the treaty or
delivering the water, article V declares:
The United States, in entering into this treaty, does not thereby
concede, expressly or by implication, any legal basis for any claims
heretofore asserted or which may be hereafter asserted by reason of any
losses incurred by the owners of land in Mexico due or alleged to be
due to the diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande within the United
States; nor does the United States in any way concede the establishment
of any general principle or precedent by the concluding of this treaty.
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tion to article II of the 1909 Treaty, the question arises as to why
that article, after incorporating the Harmon doctrine, provides in
a clause introduced by the adversative conjunction "but" that private parties injured by actions covered by the Harmon doctrine
would have the same rights and legal remedies as would be available in the country where the diversion or interference occurred.
That is, if the Harmon doctrine signified only the nonliability
of the American government for foreign consequences of United
States citizens' actions with respect to inland waters, why was it
deemed necessary to include the second half of article H providing for private redress through the courts?7"
B.

Pre-Treaty Suits Against American Diverters

One possible explanation for the apparent inconsistency of the
two parts of article II is that the second part was not meant to
qualify the Harmon doctrine. Rather, it may have been thought
that in such transnational circumstances remedies were unavailable through the courts due to jurisdictional or procedural obstacles. Returning to the diversion dispute with Mexico for
purposes of demonstration, it is notable that private actions for
recompense were not attempted in that situation, and the normal
rule requiring private parties to exhaust local remedies before resorting to governmental avenues was apparently not pressed by
the United States.
Regardless of the propriety of the result arrived at in the
1906 Treaty with Mexico in terms of international legal principles,
therefore, one cannot help but wonder whether it might have been
different if the injured Mexican citizens, instead of taking their
claims up with their government, had instituted civil actions in the
United States against the individuals diverting the water. Such
suits could presumably have been grounded upon the theory that
as riparians, the Mexicans were entitled to share in the use and
76. For a thorough and intriguing analysis of this question see Scott, supra
note 22. Although article II does not specifically mention courts, it has been read
consistently as providing for judicial rights and remedies. See, e.g., the statement of Chandler P. Anderson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
regarding article II, quoted in Bourne, supra note 62, at 454, that the claim of

injured parties
is subject to the laws of the jurisdiction where the cause of damage
arises, and they must come into the courts of that jurisdiction and
prove their case on exactly the same footing as if the property injured
was within that jurisdiction.
See also Austin, supra note 62, at 421; and Cohen, supra note 62, at 29.
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benefits of the river system on a just and reasonable basis, and
that the Americans' actions had infringed their correlative rights
to an equitable apportionment of the available water.7 7 The possibility of bringing such actions, aside from being theoretically interesting, has an important bearing upon the effect of article II
and upon the general rights of Canadians in United States courts.
A Colorado or New Mexico court trying such a case in 1895
would, in order to reach the no-compensation result arrived at by
Attorney General Harmon, have to circumvent a fourteen-yearold Texas case nearly on all fours with the hypothetical action by
78 plaintiff
the injured Mexicans. In Armendiaz v. Stillman,
brought suit in Texas for flooding damage to her land in Mexico
caused by defendant's placing obstructions on the Texas side.
That case is distinguishable from the hypothetical action only in
that both parties there were American citizens and the damage
was due to flooding rather than depletion. The citizenship of the
plaintiff should make no difference, however, since it is well established that aliens have free access to American courts. 79 Neither should the nature of plaintiffs injury render Armendiaz inapposite. Although flooding infringes absolute ownership rights
while depletion infringes an easement right, 0 this has been held
to be a distinction without a difference as to jurisdiction over an
action for injury to land in one state caused by an act in another.
We think that the cases which recognize civil and even
criminal liability for [flooding] land in one State by means
of a dam in another are hardly less pertinent. [Citing, inter
alia, Armendiaz v. Stillman.] . . . [W]e cannot assent to
the distinction between discharging and withdrawing water.
The consequence in one case is positive, in the other negative; but in each it is the consequence of an act done outside
77. For a discussion of riparian rights as a basis of a cause of action, see
Note, supra note 37, at 735-38.
78. 54 Tex. 623 (1881). See also The Salton Sea cases, 172 F. 792,
172 F. 820 (1909), discussed in note 254 infra.
79. See the Act of Congress of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, 144, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970) and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410
(1948), holding that aliens are entitled to the benefits of § 1981; and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1970) and the discussion thereof in C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
See generally, Beale, The
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 73 et seq. (2d ed. 1970).
Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners, 26 HARv. L. REV. 283, 288 (1913); 3 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 556, 562-66 (1942); 6 id. at 365;
8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 406 et seq. See also note 92 infra.
80. Manville Co. v. The City of Worcester, 138 Mass. 89, 90, 52 Am. Rep.
261, 262 (1884).
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the jurisdiction where the harm occurs,8 and the consequence
is as direct in the latter as in the former. '
Moreover, Armendiaz would have offered a fitting illustration of
the exception to the general rule that a court cannot take juris82
diction over an action based on a tort against foreign real property.
This rule is usually restricted to cases in which both the act and the
injury occur out of the court's jurisdiction and where there is physical damage to the real estate.8 3 Since Armendiaz allowed recovery
for flooding damage, a physical injury to property, depletion, an injury to a usufructory right which is a mere incorporeal hereditament, would seem to be a fortiori cognizable.
A wealth of interstate depletion cases had been decided by
1884 which concerned the same issue met by Armendiaz, namely,
whether a court sitting where the allegedly delictual act was committed may award damages for an injury sustained to real property in another jurisdiction.14 These cases all recognized the rule
laid down by Lord Coke in Bulwer's Case"5 that where an act in
one jurisdiction gives rise to an injury to real property in another,
an exception to the general rule that actions for injuries to foreign
land must be brought where the land is situated 6 entitles plaintiff
to elect whether to sue where the injury was sustained or where
the act was committed.
81. Id.
82. See the cases cited in note 84 infra and accompanying text and part
HI, A. infra. The Texas Supreme Court held in Armendiaz that the Texas
statute requiring the venue in suits for damages to land to be laid in the county
where the land is situated refers to actions for damages to land in some county

in Texas.
83. Id.
84. See Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal, 1 Wall. Jr. 275, Fed. Cas. No.
12,139 (1849), aff'd, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852) [applying the doctrine of
Bulwer's Case, 7 Coke, la, 77 Eng. Reprint 411 (1584)]; Foot v. Edwards, 3

Blatchf. 310, Fed. Cas. No. 4,908 (1851); and Manville Co. v. Worcester,
138 Mass. 89, 52 Am. Rep. 261 (1884). See also Slack v. Walcott, 3 Mason
508, Fed. Cas. No. 12,932 (1825); Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co., 3 Woodb.

& M. 538, Fed. Cas. No. 13,446 (1847); and Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio 849,
49 Am. Dec. 474 (1848).

Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N.H. 462 (1851),

is noteworthy because a New Hampshire court was held to have jurisdiction to
enjoin acts of trespass upon a dam in Maine which caused injury to plaintiff's
land in New Hampshire.

85. 7 Coke la, 77 Eng. Reprint 411 (1584).
86. See, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411
(1811); McKenna v. Fiske, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241 (1843); Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105 (1895); British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Mozambique, [1893] A.C. 602; Albert v. Fraser Cos., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39, 11
M.P.R. 209; and the cases collected in 42 A.L.R. 196, 197.
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The Mexican citizens would also have had the valuable support of opinions delivered by two august jurists, Story and Holmes,
JJ., in the field of water rights. In Slack v. Walcott,s 7 Judge Story
reasoned that since a water right is an incorporeal hereditament
which is only attached to real estate, it has no situs, and an action
for injury thereto may be brought either in the jurisdiction where
the diversion was made, or where the injury was suffered. And
in Mannville Co. v. Worcester,"' decided three years after Armendiaz, Judge Holmes, in holding that a tort action would lie in one
state for a diversion of water from a stream in that state which injured a mill in another state, stated in response to defendant's contention that the action would be brought only in the state where the
damaged realty was located,
[t]his objection is purely technical. The reasons which once
made the venue important have long disappeared, and we
see no reason for any greater strictness than is absolutely
required by the statutes and precedents. 9
He concluded that "[t]he weight of judicial opinion is altogether
in favor of allowing an action to be maintained where the water
was withdrawn,"" and cited as authority, inter alia, Armendiaz v.
Stillman."'
It is therefore probable that under United States decisional
and statutory law existing in 1895 the Mexican citizens injured by
the actions of Colorado and New Mexico farmers and ranchers
could have maintained civil actions in the United States against
those responsible to recover compensation for infringement of their
water rights.9 2 Accordingly, if article I's private remedies provision was thought necessary to allow suit in America solely
because of private international law limitations, the provision
is unnecessary. But since a construction which ascribes reasonable meaning to a provision is preferred to one which produces
87. 3 Mason 508, Fed. Cas. No. 12,932 (1825).
88. 138 Mass. 89, 52 Am. Rep. 261 (1884).
89. 138 Mass. 89, 91; 52 Am. Rep. 261, 263 (1884).
90. Id.
91. 54 Tex. 623 (1881). Also cited were Foot v. Edwards, 3 Blatchf. 310,
Fed. Cas. No. 4,908 (1851); Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co., 3 Woodb. & M.
538, Fed. Cas. No. 13,446 (1847); Rundle v. Delaware and R. Canal, 1 Wall. Jr.
275, Fed. Cas. No. 12,139 (1849); and Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio 849, 49 Am.
Dec. 474 (1848).
92. It was the opinion of the United States Attorney General in 1907
[26 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 250 (1907).] that such an action could also have been
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350k. See text accompanying notes 206-10 infra.
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a nullity, 93 the possibility that the provision was intended as an
exemption from the Harmon doctrine must be considered.
C.

The Influence of PublicInternationalLaw

It is quite likely that Canada, as a potential future victim of
Harmon doctrine diversions, viewed the Rio Grande controversy
with rapt attention, and would have been understandably concerned over the unfavorable outcome for the injured Mexicans.
To avoid Mexico's fate of having to waive all claims to compensation for public and private injury in return for water, at least some
of which she was arguably entitled to anyway, 4 Canada insisted
upon inclusion of a provision in the 1909 Treaty specifically to
guard against another United States invocation of the Harmon
doctrine to avoid liability. Pursuant to the compromise which left
the Harmon doctrine intact but allowed Canada assurances of private recourse, the two countries recognized each others' exclusive
sovereignty over wholly inland waters but guaranteed each other's
citizens reciprocal rights in case of injuries suffered in situations
95
where the Harmon doctrine would normally apply.
Since it appears that the type of transnational suits authorized
in article II would have been possible in 1895 under rules of private international law, it is difficult to explain the purpose of the
private remedies provision unless the framers of the 1909 Treaty
viewed such suits as being proscribed by rules of public international law-specifically by Attorney General Harmon's pronouncement in that year that use of inland waters by Americans
would give rise to no liability on the part of the United States for
extraterritorial injuries. That is, the Harmon doctrine could have
been viewed as preventing private actions as well as public recourse. This interpretation was advanced by Mr. Robert Day
97
Scott,96 writing in the context of the Columbia River dispute.
As early as 1839 Chief Justice Taney, while observing that
"where the right of individuals are concerned,"9 8 the established
93. De Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1890).
94. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 62, at 407.
95. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, 36 Stat. 2443 (1910), T.S. No. 548
(effective May 13, 1910), art. II. For a description of the American and

Canadian positions and the ultimate compromise, see Johnson, supra note 62, at
702-06.
96. See Scott, supra note 22.
97. See generally Johnson, supra note 62.
98. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589 (1839).
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practice of recognizing and executing foreign laws through extension of comity "is no impeachment of sovereignty," 9 quoted Story
approvingly that
[i]n the silence of any positive rule, affirming, or denying,
or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice
presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government; unless they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial
to its interests. It is not the comity of the courts, but the
comity of the nation which is administered. ....
By this reasoning, then, the United States' denial of liability for
damage in Mexico could be taken to establish a "positive rule
. . . denying, or restraining the operation of [such Mexican] laws"
as would create enforceable rights in the injured parties, since such
laws, in giving rise to liability in America, would be "repugnant to
[United States] policy, [and] prejudicial to its interests."
Over half a century later, these lines from Chief Justice Taney's opinion were marshalled in support of appellants 1° in the
case of Hilton v. Guyot 0 2 by Elihu Root, then in private practice,
03
and quoted approvingly by the Supreme Court in its opinion.1
Hilton involved the question of the force and effect to be accorded
a money judgment rendered by a French court with proper jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. The Court held that
since France refused reciprocity to foreign judgments and since
there was no treaty or statute which compelled recognition of the
French judgment, it was not entitled to conclusive effect under
either principles of international law or United States comity.
Writing for the majority Mr. Justice Gray took particular
note of the impact of "international law"-including both private
international law and the law of nations-upon suits between private litigants. 04 He relied heavily upon Justice Story's Commen.00

99. Id.
100. Id., citing STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 38 (emphasis added).
101. 159 U.S. 113, 135-36 (1895).
102. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
103. Id. at 165-66.
104. Mr. Justice Gray made the following observation as to the application of
international law to suits between individuals:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-4ncluding not only questions of right between nations, governed by what
has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions
arising under what is usually called private international law, or the
conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public,
done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often
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taries on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, which was of
10 5
pervasive influence in the area of private international law.
Story's work reflected current thinking on the relationship between
public and private international law:
Important writers on private international law in the 19th
century built their theories of jurisdiction or choice of law
international law: sovupon fundamental concepts of 10public
6
ereignty, nationality, and so on.
Thus the concept of the "comity of nations," which was perhaps
the cornerstone of Justice Gray's opinion, was viewed by Story as
constituting
the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws
of one nation within the territories of another. It is derived
altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter; and is
inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy, or prejudicial to its interests. . . . It is not the comity of the courts,
but the comity of the nation which is administered .... 107
To the framers of the 1909 Treaty, whose number included
Elihu Root, these words from Story as incorporated in the Supreme
Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot very probably meant that
United States courts would administer international law as expressed by the Harmon doctrine to deny the liability of American
diverters for extraterritorial injury. Thus the second part of article II would be necessary to preserve foreign private rights from
the private international law effects which Hilton would have
given the Harmon doctrine of no governmental liability in public
international law.
The probability that this was the prevailing view when the
1909 Treaty was being formulated is strengthened by the fact that
a state court decision handed down at that time reached the same
result. In Minnesota Canal and Power Co. v. Pratt'0 it was contended that a proposed condemnation of land for a diversion canal
would violate international comity because the canal would divert
water from a system of waters which crossed the Canadian boundas such questions are presented in litigation between man and man,
duly submitted to their determination.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
105. See generally Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961).
106. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 685 (1968).
107. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 36-37 (2d ed.
1841).
108. 101 Minn. 197, 112 N.W. 395 (1907).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1973

25

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1973], Art. 18
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 3

ary. The Minnesota Supreme Court cited the Harmon opinion
and held, "[tihe United States, therefore, recognizes no international comity which prevents it from exercising full control over
the waters which lie within its geographical boundaries. '1 0 Despite the court's broad language, however, this case is not precedent on the question of whether a United States court may extend
comity to a private foreign claim, since such a claim was not involved in the action.
It is therefore possible that according to early 20th century
legal thought Attorney General Harmon's denial of United States
liability in public international law prevented extension of judicial
comity to foreign private claims. But that view would not comport with the modern conception of private international law.
Most courts and authors today would view the enforcement
of judgments or choice of law as within the domain of national law or private law, formally independent of international law except to the extent that they are brought within
treaty arrangements.
In more significant ways, thinking about private international law has departed radically from the premises of
Story. Courts and scholars have stressed the inadequacy of
a generic principle such as comity, or of general principles
of customary international law, to resolve complex questions
of jurisdiction, judgments or choice of law. 1 10
In summation it may be said that suits for extraterritorial diversion injuries were jurisdictionally possible in the United States
at the time of the 1909 Treaty and that the private remedies provision of article II was inserted to circumvent the private law effects attached by the framers of the 1909 Treaty to the Harmon
doctrine. But the exculpatory effect of that principle has never
been carried over to pollution of inland waters-indeed, such pollution causing trans-boundary injury is proscribed by article IVand in any event, Attorney General Harmon's opinion is now in
all probability a dead letter."' Therefore, the statement that
109. 101 Minn. 197, 230 (1907).
110. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 106, at 686. See generally Nussbaum, The Rise and Decline of the Law of Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1942); Riphagen, The Relationship Between
Public and Private Law and the Rules of Conflict of Laws, 102 ACADEMIE DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURs 215 (1961); Scott, supra note 22;
and Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 561 (1952).
111. See note 63 supra.
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without article II there would be, "under existing conditions no
remedies or redress""' 2 is presently at best of doubtful validity
as to diversion injuries, and of no consequence whatever in respect

of trans-boundary pollution injuries.
III.

SUING AT THE PLACE OF THE ACT:
1 13
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A.

Common Law

The threshold issue of establishing personal jurisdiction over
the defendant is a potentially thorny problem in suits against foreign defendants, and may be a decisive factor in plaintiff's choice
of a forum. In some transnational pollution actions it will be
impossible to bring defendant before a court at the place of the
injury since the conditions necessary for assertion of personal jurisdiction will not be present." 4 Defendant can cause the damage
without entering plaintiff's jurisdiction, and is thus not subject to
service of process unless it can be effected pursuant to a long-arm
statute 1" or upon an agent of a defendant who does business
within the jurisdiction. Further, if defendant has no assets within the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred, he might simply
disregard any proceedings there, forcing plaintiff to obtain a
default judgment of uncertain enforceability in defendant's country." 6' Therefore, plaintiff will often have to resort to bringing
suit in the foreign country," 7 probably in the jurisdiction where
the act giving rise to his injury was committed. Since this will be
true in many transnational pollution actions, and because plaintiff
will avoid many problems if he can sue at the place of the in112. See note 22 supra, and quote in accompanying text.
113. Decisions are not in agreement as to whether suits for injury to foreign
land caused by acts at the forum involve issues of subject matter jurisdiction or
venue. The distinction is usually not discussed at all, but American courts seem
to characterize the question as one of venue [see, e.g., text accompanying notes
139 and 150 infra] while the Canadian cases speak of subject matter jurisdiction
[see note 163 and accompanying text infra]. The emphasis in the present inquiry
is upon whether the court will entertain the action rather than characterization
of the issue, and the term "subject matter jurisdiction" is used here merely for
convenience.
114. Statutes allowing assertion of jurisdiction over absent defendants are
discussed in part flI., A. infra.
115. Id.
116. The enforceability of foreign judgments is discussed in part IV., B. infra.
117. On the problems faced by litigants in foreign courts see generally

F.

DAWSON &

I.

HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS

AND THE

RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1971).
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jury, this section will examine in some detail issues raised by ac-

tions brought in defendant's country. Suits for personal injuries
will not be considered since they raise no significant issues of subject matter jurisdiction.
Since most trans-boundary pollution actions will involve an
issue of damage to foreign land or fixtures, they must circumvent an ancient but still vital rule of subject matter jurisdiction
which stands like Cerberus at the court's threshold: an action
ex delicto based upon a tort against real property is a local action
and must be brought where the land is located." 8 Despite being
attacked as unnecessary" 9 and unjust, 2 ° this requirement has
stubbornly persisted and is still the common law rule in most
states 2' and Canada,' 22 and has been applied by analogy in petitions for equitable remedies. 23 The rule has been blessed nei-

ther by clarity of exposition nor by consistency of application and
118. See cases cited in note 86 supra.
119. The doctrine that no action will lie for an injury to foreign
land is a very old one. . . . It is a lingering vestige of the ancient
rule that the venue of every fact must be truly stated in the plaintiff's
pleading so that a jury can be summoned from that place. In the sixteenth century the courts relaxed this rule so far as to allow a plaintiff
whose cause of action arose outside England to say in some cases, that
it arose in Cheapside.
But this indulgence was never extended to
plaintiffs seeking recovery upon a local cause of action. And the category of local causes of action included suits for the recovery of land or
damages for trespass to land.
M. HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 97-98 (1942).
See also
Kuhn, Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law, 66 U. PA. L
REV. 301 (1918).
Most writers favor allowing actions for trespass to foreign
land. See, e.g., 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1652-59 (1935); G. CHESHIRE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 481 (8th ed. 1970); A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 149 (8th ed. 1967); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
140-41 (1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 177-78 (Scholes, 4th ed. 1964);
M. HANCOCK, supra at 95-100.
120. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87
(1971) and Willis, Jurisdiction of Courts-Action to Recover Damages for Injury to Foreign Land, 15 CAN. B. REV. 112 (1937).
121. Apparently only three states allow actions to be maintained for trespass to foreign land at common law: Reason-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark.
524, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952); Little v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 65
Minn. 48, 67 N.W. 846 (1968); Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153
S.W.2d 547 (Mo. App. 1941). The rule has been abolished by statute in New
York, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 536 (McKinney 1968); Texas, R.S. 1198, as interpreted by Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 627 (1881); and Virginia, 1 REV.
CODE 1819, § 14, at 450; and since the common law is not followed in Louisiana, the rule does not apply there. Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849).
122. Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39. See notes 161-75
infra.
123. See, e.g., Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan C.R. Co., 56 U.S. 233
(1853); and Laslie v. Gragg Lumber Co., 184 Ga. 794 (1937).
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it is thus uncertain whether it applies only to actions involving the
title or right to possession of foreign land at one extreme,1 24 or
to all actions to recover damages for injury to foreign land, at the
other.' 25 The distinction between actions in personam and in
rem is probably more helpful than the local-transitory distinction
upon which this rule is based. 12 This point 1 was
noticed by both
28
127
and Chief Justice Marshall.
Lord Mansfield

Situations involving an act in one jurisdiction giving rise to
an injury to land in another jurisdiction present special problems.
If defendant cannot be sued at the place of the allegedly tortious
conduct because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
(the injured land), plaintiff will be left remediless unless defendant has property or can be served with process in the jurisdiction
in which the injury occurred. Many courts have avoided the injustice of this result by applying an exception to the general rule;
originally recognized by Lord Coke in Bulwer's Case.'29 In that
case it was held that when an act in one jurisdiction gives rise to an
injury in another, an action can be maintained in either jurisdiction. 130 This exception has received wide acceptance in the United
States but has not found favor with Canadian courts, as will be seen
below.
1. Suits by Canadians in the United States-A suit brought
in the United States by a Canadian plaintiff against an American
124. This is Cheshire's view of the true holding of the leading English case,
British South Africa Company v. Companhia de Morambique, [1893] A.C. 602.
See G. CHESHIRE, supra note 119, at 438. The Appellate Division of the New
Brunswick Supreme Court expressly rejected this narrow formulation of the rule,
however, in Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd., [19371 1 D.L.R. 39.
125. This is apparently the Canadian view, as handed down in the Albert
case, id. See Willis, supra note 120 at 113-14.
126. Probably the sound distinction is that made by Lord Mansfield-between actions in rem where the judgment cannot be effective unless
the subject-matter lies within the control of the court, and actions
against the person in which only damages are claimed. . . . An action for injury to land, whether trespass or case, falls within the latter
class.

G.

CHESHIRE,

supra note 119, at 481.

127. Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774) Cowp. pt. 1, at 161, 98 Eng. Reprint 1021.
128. Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411 (1811).
129. 7 Coke, la, 77 Eng. Reprint 411 (1584).
130. See cases cited in note 84 supra, and Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., 136
Ky. 162, 123 S.W. 678 (1909); Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Co. v.
Barnes, 60 S.W. 593 (Tenn. 1900); 3 BEALE, supra note 119 at 1659. A number of United States cases have either held or indicated in dicta that a court with
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can compel the performance or
cessation of acts in the forum state which injure land in another jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911); Royal R. Co. v. Hammond,
58 Ga. 523 (1877) (dictum).
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polluter would raise many of the same issues involved in the diversion actions already discussed.13 1 While there appear to be no
recorded decisions involving trans-boundary pollution between the
United States and Canada, 1 32 interstate cases in which an act in
one state causes injury in another provide useful analogies to transnational actions. The Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal, in determining the rights and liabilities of the United States and Canada
in international law for injuries to United States citizens from a
Canadian smelter, relied upon cognate interstate controversies
which had been decided by the United States Supreme Court.1 33
Since the United States and Canada have similar legal systems
and traditions, United States courts would presumably apply the
same principles of subject matter jurisdiction in private actions between citizens of the United States and Canada as are applied in
suits between citizens of different quasi-sovereign states.
There is ample United States precedent for awarding damages for injuries to real property in another jurisdiction."3
The
Armendiaz case, 3 5 in which the Texas Supreme Court awarded
damages for acts in Texas which injured land in Mexico, closely
parallels an action for pollution damage to land in Canada. 31 In
Armendiaz an American plaintiff brought an action in Texas to
recover compensation for flooding damage to her land in Mexico.
In comparing that case with a Canadian plaintiff's pollution action
in America, distinctions may be drawn between the citizenship of
the plaintiffs and the type of injury. But it is submitted that both
of these variations are inconsequential: as to the first, a Canadian
plaintiff would have free access to American courts; 37 as to the
second, in both pollution and flooding situations the consequential
damage to land is occasioned through the medium of natural resources by an act done outside the jurisdiction. 3 The defendant
131.

See text accompanying notes 79-91 supra.

132. The current suit by the State of Ohio against a Canadian chemical
company is discussed in note 266 infra.
133. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 684, 713 (1941).
134. See text accompanying notes 79-91 supra.
135. 54 Tex. 623 (1881). For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 78-83 supra.
136. See also The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 792, 172 F. 820 (1909), discussed in note 254 infra, where an injunction was granted to restrain defendant
from causing further damage to land in California by water works in Mexico.
137. See note 79 supra.
138. Cf. the quotation from Judge Holmes' opinion in Manville Co. v. The
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in Armendiaz contended that the cause of action for damage to
foreign realty was local and should have been brought in Mexico.
But the court applied the exception to the general rule and held
venue to be properly laid in Texas, despite a Texas statute requiring
suits for damage to land to be brought in the county where the
land is situated. 3 9
A leading case involving pollution damage to land outside
the jurisdiction, often cited along with the diversion and flooding
cases as support for the exception to the local action rule, is
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes.4 0 That case
was an action to enjoin suits at law brought under a nuisance theory by owners of land in Georgia. The landowners sought compensation for damage to their timber and crops caused by smoke
and noxious gases from a smelter located in Tennessee. One of the
smelting company's contentions was that the suits for damages
involved issues of title, right or interest in land and were therefore
local and had to be brought in the county and state where the land
was situated.' 4 ' The court answered that the landowner's actions
do not involve title to land, nor the assertion of a right to an
interest in land. The actions are purely actions for damages sustained by virtue of a nuisance operated by the complainant. The action was personal, and not local; and the
appellees, although residents of the state of Georgia, and
although the injury done was to property in the state of
Georgia, had the right to maintain their suits in the courts
42
of Tennessee.1
City of Worcester, 138 Mass. 89, 52 Am. Rep. 261 (1884) in text accompanying
note 81 supra.

139. See note 82 supra.
140. 60 S.W. 593 (Tenn. 1900). But see Arvidson v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
107 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash. 1952). Plaintiff there brought a trespass action
to recover damages for injury to his Washington land by emissions from defendant's plant in Oregon. In denying defendant's motion for transfer of the
cause to the District Court in Oregon, the court held that the Oregon court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. With respect to subject
matter jurisdiction the court said:
It may well be that the law of some states, and perhaps of the
majority, is that an interstate trespass can be prosecuted either in the
state of origin or in the state of injury. But the courts of the State of
Oregon held that no jurisdiction in them subsists over a trespass upon
land in another jurisdiction ....

Hence, the United States District

Court for the District of Oregon has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action.
Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
141. 60 S.W. 593 at 599.
142. Id. at 606-07.
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It is interesting that the court does not expressly refer to the exception to the local action rule but rather labels the landowners' suits
"personal, and not local . . . although the injury done was to
property in the state of Georgia ... ."" Implicit in this holding is the suggestion that since the action for damages was founded
upon a nuisance theory, it did not claim a trespassory invasion of
property rights, but a nontrespassory interference with defendants'
use and enjoyment of their land.' 44 Alternatively, the court's
reasoning might have been that since the suits claimed damages
from the defendant personally, the judgment could be effective
without control over the allegedly injured property, 45 and that
therefore the actions were not local in nature. A court which
would characterize an action for trespass quare clausum fregit or
trespass on the case as a local action on the ground that the essence
of both torts is damage to land might allow an action based on
nuisance under the former rationale, since a nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the use of property which does not necessarily cause physical injury. 11 In any event, the landowners did
succeed in surmounting the jurisdictional barrier and recovered
what amounted to indemnity for the damage to their land.
Smith v. Southern Ry. Co.' 47 is a case which deals solely
and exhaustively with the issue of whether a court can entertain
an action for injury to land in another state caused by an act in
the forum state. Plaintiff sued in Kentucky to recover damages
for destruction of his building in Tennessee by the negligent explosion of dynamite in one of defendant's railroad cars in Kentucky. In reversing the decision below the court held that Kentucky's venue statute, 48 providing that an action for injury to
143. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
144. The invasion of a personal interest is the essence of the tort of nuisance.
See Mandell v. Pivnick, 30 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125, 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 594-95 (4th ed. 1971): "The distinction which is now

accepted is that trespass is an invasion of plaintiff's interest in the exclusive
possession of his land, while nuisance is an interference with his use and enjoyment of it." Citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to ch. 40, preceeding § 822.
145. See note 126 supra.
146. See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611) where,
in one of the earliest recorded nuisance cases, the court affirmed the award of
damages and an injunction to plaintiff, whose air had been corrupted by defendant's hog sty.
147. 136 Ky. 162, 123 S.W. 678 (Ky. App. 1909).
148. CiV. CODE PRAC. § 62, subsec. 4.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/18

32

McCaffrey: Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations
1973

TRANs-BouNDARY POLLUTION INJURIES

real property must be brought in the county in which the subject
of the action is located, was not to be arbitrarily enforced where
the injury to the real estate results from an act outside the jurisdiction in which the real estate is situated. 1 49 The court reasoned that
where an act in one jurisdiction gives rise to an injury in another,
the injury and wrongful act are to be regarded as having occurred together or in immediate connection and in the same
jurisdiction, or either of two jurisdictions. Consequently
the venue may be laid in either jurisdiction.' 50
In reaching this result, the court observed that the right of election
of forum was first recognized in Bulwer's Case,'5 ' and relied upon
the flooding and diversion cases discussed above and the Ducktown Sulphur case.
Two other cases involving issues cognate to those raised in
transnational pollution actions dramatically illustrate the American
courts' disenchantment with the local action rule. In Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Kezer'5 2 an action was allowed in
Texas for flooding damage to land in New Mexico caused by
defendant's dam. The dam had been built on the Texas side of
the Rio Grande, but had so changed the river's channel that at
the time of the injury it was on the New Mexico side of the river.
The court held that the action would lie in Texas nonetheless, reasoning that only the location of the dam at the time it was built
was relevant for purposes of determining proper venue. 53 And
in Otey v. Midland Valley Ry Co., 5 4 where a spark from defendant's engine started a fire which destroyed plaintiff's building in
Oklahoma, the Kansas court held that it made no difference
whether the fire was started by the engine in Oklahoma or Kansas
for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. 155 Thus the court
would presumably have taken jurisdiction even if both elements of
the tort, the negligent starting of the fire and the destruction of
plaintiffs building, had occurred in Oklahoma, outside the court's
jurisdiction.
149. 136 Ky. 162, 165, 123 S.W. 678, 679 (1909).
150.

136 Ky. 162, 171, 123 S.W. 678, 680 (1909).

151. 7 Coke, la, 77 Eng. Reprint 411 (1584).
152.

174 S.W. 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).

153. Id. at 670.
154. 108 Kan. 755, 197 P. 203 (1921).
155. Contrast this decision with the Canadian court's holding in Boslund v.
Abbotsford Lumber, [1925] 1 D.LR. 978, discussed in text accompanying notes
176-79 infra.
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These cases demonstrate clearly the willingness of American
courts to take cognizance of actions at law involving damage to
foreign land when the injury was caused by an act within the court's
jurisdiction. Since the court needs only power over the person
of the defendant to grant effective relief, it would make no difference that the land involved was located in Canada. 15
2. Suits by Americans in Canada-The primary difference
between Canadian and American decisions involving foreign land
is that Canadian courts are more constrained by strict attentiveness
to English precedent. In the leading British case on jurisdiction
in actions for injury to foreign real property, British South Africa
Co. v. Companhia de Moambique,15 7 the House of Lords held
that an action to recover damages for a trespass to foreign land
may not be entertained in English courts. The claim in Mogambique was to some extent implicated with questions of title to the
foreign land' 58 and concerned an alleged trespass quare clausum
fregit which occurred wholly in the foreign country. Its holding,
however, has been applied by Canadian courts both to cases in
which no question of title was involved, 5 ' and to those in which
an act in one jurisdiction injured land in another. 60
One of the leading Canadian cases on jurisdiction over actions relating to foreign land involved a trans-boundary fact situation. In Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd.'" l plaintiff sued in
a New Brunswick court seeking compensation for flooding damage to his land and personalty in Quebec caused by defendant's
alleged negligence in allowing logs to accumulate and dam a river
in New Brunswick. Plaintiff contended that where title to land
"in another country" is not in issue, an action for injury to such
156. Indeed, the Arnendiaz case, 54 Tex. 623 (1881), in awarding damages
for injury to land in Mexico, relied upon American interstate cases.
157. [1893] A.C. 602.

158. [Alithough the claim for damages for trespass to the Mogambique land was the only claim actually argued before the House of

Lords, it was inextricably entangled with two other far more substantial
claims, for a declaration of title and an injunction restraining interference with possession, to which it had been in the lower courts a mere

adjunct. Even in the House of Lords the real substance of the plaintiff's claim was for an indirect declaration of title to the land. To
this claim the House very properly refused to acceed.
Willis, supra note 120, at 112-13.

159. Albert v. Fraser Cos. Ltd., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39, 43 (N.B. 1936).
160. See, e.g., Albert v. Fraser Cos. Ltd., id.; Brereton v. Canadian P.R. Co.,
(1898)

29 Ont. Rep. 57; and Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, Min. and Devel.

Co., Ltd., [19251 1 D.L.R. 978 (B.C. 1925).
161. [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39 (N.B. 1936).

Criticized in Willis, supra note 120.
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land is transitory, and in any event the claims for damages to his
personalty were transitory. It was further claimed that the cause
of action arose in New Brunswick since defendant's alleged negligence occurred there and that since the court had jurisdiction over
the parties it had jurisdiction to redress the injury. Defendant
answered by denying that plaintiff was the owner of the lands in
question or was in possession of them at any material time. The
court, per Baxter, C.J., observed that the injuries to personal
property were alleged to have occurred in consequence of the injuries to plaintiff's real property and noted that "[t]here is certainly nowhere any allegation of direct injury to personal property.'

1' 62

After discussing several old English cases which did not involve questions of title but which nevertheless refused to entertain
jurisdiction of actions concerning foreign land, the court dealt extensively with the Mozambique case. Chief Justice Baxter observed that the House of Lords had characterized the question as
"not one of venue but of jurisdiction"' 61 and stated that under that
case, "[t]he moment it appears that the controversy relates to land
in a foreign country our jurisdiction is excluded,"' 16 irrespective
of whether title to land is in question.' 65 Mogambique was given
162. Id. at 43.
163. Id. at 45.
164. Id. The court took note of Mr. Justice Holmes' decision in Manville
Co. v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 89 (1884), but said that Holmes treated the
question as one of venue without distinguishing between venue and jurisdiction.
165. But see the following Canadian cases in which jurisdiction was exercised even though an incidental question of title to foreign lands was involved:
McLaren v. Ryan, 36 U.C.Q.B. 307 (C.A. 1875) (court would not decide upon
title to bind land or parties interested in it, but would determine it for purpose
only of saying whether plaintiff was entitled to be paid for timber he claimed);
Stuart v. Baldwin, 41 U.C.Q.B. 466 (C.A. 1877) (semble, the local action rule
should be restricted to cases where title to foreign land is main point at issue;
where title merely incidental, though essential part of plaintiff's case, local action rule will not be applied where court otherwise has jurisdiction); and Malo
and Berthrand v. Clement, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 773 (Ont. 1943). In the latter
case, decided after Albert, the tenant of a building in Quebec brought an action
in Ontario against a person alleged to have been the owner to recover damages
resulting from the building's collapse. The Ontario Supreme Court held that
defendant's claim that he was not the real owner did not oust the court of jurisdiction. Resisting a mechanical application of the local action rule, the Court,
after noting that personal jurisdiction over defendant had been established by
service within the Court's jurisdiction, continued:
The claim is one which, if well founded, the Courts of this Province
can enforce. They can give an effective judgment. The question of
title to land in Quebec arises only incidentally.
Id. at 776, citing DICEY ON CONFLICT OF LAws 207, 228 (5th ed. 1932).
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this broad interpretation in spite of the court's observation that its
holding went beyond its fact situation.' 6 6
On the strength of the English rule as laid down in Mozambique the court declined to entertain jurisdiction of the claim for
both real and personal property. Baxter, C.J., reasoned that the
injuries to personalty were caused "indirectly through the medium
of the real estate,"' 6 7 and that since the court could not adjudicate the claim for injury to realty, it could not deal with the consequential injury to personal property. The case of Brereton v.
Canadian P. R. Co., 65 where a fire caused by defendant burned
plaintiff's house and furniture in another jurisdiction, was distinguished. Although the court in that case allowed the action for
destruction of the personal property, it did so only after plaintiff
abandoned all claims for injury to the realty. Further, the damage to personalty in that case was deemed a direct consequence of
defendant's negligence, where such damage was only an indirect
consequence of the injury to realty in Albert.
The dissenting opinion of Harrison, J. is worthy of note for
the views it offers in answer to those subscribed to by the majority.
He first disposed of defendant's contention that title was involved
by pointing out that "defendant cannot oust this Court of juris' 69
diction by merely putting in a plea denying the plaintiff's title.'
Turning to Mogambique, Harrison, J. observed that since that was
a case of trespass quare clausum fregit to foreign land, it is not
directly applicable to the facts in Albert. He noted that Movambique would probably be apposite to an action of trespass on the
case where both the act and injury occurred in the foreign country; it should not be controlling, however, where the act and injury occur in different jurisdictions. On the latter point, Harrison,
166. [E]ven though the expressions used in the Mogambique case may
seem to be somewhat wider than were called for in a decision upon the
particular facts of the case, yet I cannot help thinking that the decision

was intended as an emphatic declaration that in no case, where the

controversy related to foreign land, would the Courts of our country

assume jurisdiction.
[1937] 1 D.L.R. at 45 (Baxter, C.J.).
167. Id. at 47.
See also Winnipeg Oil v. Can. Nor. Ry., 18
168. 29 O.R. 57 (1899).
W.L.R. 421, 21 Man. R. 274 (C.A. 1911), in which the Manitoba court of
appeals followed Brereton to allow recovery for damage to personal property in

an action in which fire from sparks from defendant's engine caused damage to
plaintiff's house and its contents in an adjoining Province.

169. [19371 1 D.L.R. at 50.
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J. cited Bulwer's Case170 as the applicable authority and pointed
out that in any event, the Mozambique rule should not be transplanted to Canada: "The geography of the British Isles would
give little opportunity for such a question to arise there. It is
quite different in Canada with at least six interprovincial boundary lines." Finally, Justice Harrison analyzed the nature of the
cause of action and remarked that unlike the situation in Mozambique, "this is not the case of a matter which is 'local and arose
outside the realm (i.e., New Brunswick).' "171 Rather, the cause
of action has two elements, one of which arose in Quebec and one
in New Brunswick. Therefore, since the cause of action is in172
complete in both jurisdictions, suit may be brought in either.
Despite the majority's strained application of technical English rules of questionable relevance to the fact situation, Albert v.
FraserCompanies Ltd. has been uniformly accepted in Canada as
standing for the sweeping proposition that Canadian courts lack jurisdiction to entertain actions to recover damages for injuries to
foreign land. 1 73 The dubious foundation and foreseeably objectionable consequences of this rule have led one Canadian commentator to remark:
The rule is unnecessary and unjust . . . . Because P
and D, although belonging to the same geographical and economic area, happen to belong to different legal areas, P is
174
left wholly remediless.
It appears, therefore, that although it is by no means on all fours
with a hypothetical action by an American plaintiff against a Canadian polluter, this case would constitute a formidable obstacle
to such an action in view of its parallel facts and the court's statement that "Quebec is, of course, for the purpose of this case, a
75
foreign country.'
A case in which the facts are closely analogous to a transboundary pollution situation is Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber,
170. 7 Coke, la, 77 Eng. Reprint 411 (1584).
Harrison, J. also discussed
Leveridge v. Hoskins, 11 Mod. 257, 88 E.R. 1025 in which the court of Queen's
Bench, in a suit for diverting water in Dorset causing damage in Devon, held that

the cause of action arose in both counties and could be brought in either.
171. [19371 1 D.L.R. at 52.
172. Citing 3 BEALE, supra note 119, at 1659.
173. See Willis, supra note 120, at 113.

174. Id. at 114.
175.

[1937] 1 D.L.R. at 46.
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Mining and Development Co. Ltd. 7 ' In that case, a fire started
by defendant company in British Columbia went out of control
and spread across the border where it damaged plaintiffs' real and
personal property in the state of Washington. Plaintiffs' action
for damages sounded in negligence and there is no mention in the
opinion of any claim based upon trespass. The court first satisfied itself that the conditions necessary for entertaining an action
for an alleged foreign tort, prescribed by the English case of Phillips
v. Eyre,117 were present: the alleged wrong would have been actionable if it had been committed in British Columbia; and the acts
were not justifiable under the law of Washington. Phillips involved a tort committed wholly in Jamaica. In applying the test
articulated in that case to a multiple contact situation, the Boslund
court utilized Machado v. Fontes17 1 in which an English court entertained jurisdiction of an alleged libel published in Brazil. Thus
the action was deemed maintainable in British Columbia whether
the tort was committed wholly in one or the other jurisdiction, or
partly in each.
The British Columbia court did not discuss plaintiffs' claim
respecting the foreign land solely in terms of jurisdiction, but
merely declared that plaintiffs could not "recover damages for injury done to real estate situated in the State of Washington
... ,"179 The court therefore did not allow damages in respect
of buildings, fences, trees and soil, but did grant recovery for personal injuries and injuries to chattels, including growing crops.
This is consistent with Albert's analysis of the Brereton case where
the injury to personalty by fire was deemed a direct consequence
of defendant's negligence; however, unlike the Albert case, the
court in Boslund said nothing about splitting causes of action or
abandoning the claim for injury to realty.
To summarize, the above cases indicate that Canadian courts
would decline to exercise jurisdiction in any litigation involving
injury to foreign land. The Canadian courts appear to rely upon
the Monambique case, which if restricted to its facts would only bar
actions for trespass quare clausum fregit to foreign land. They
have gone further, however, refusing to award damages for neg176. [1925] 1 D.L.R. 978 (B.C. 1925).

177. (1870) 6 Q.B. 1. See also text accompanying note 248 infra.
178. (1897) 2 Q.B. 31.
179. [1925] 1 D.L.R. at 981.
case.

The court cited, inter alia, the Mofambique
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80
ligence, and arguably for any tort which injures foreign realty.1
However, a suit would probably be entertained in Canada which
sought compensation for personal injuries or damage to chattels,
including crops, occurring in a foreign jurisdiction, at least so
8
long as they were not consequential upon injury to realty.' '
These conclusions are supported by views that were expressed2
during the preparatory negotiations in the Trail Smelter case.'1
The normal recourse for the injured Washington residents of bringing an action against the British Columbia smelter for damages
and an injunction was deemed unavailable in those circumstances:
It was the general opinion of the lawyers concerned at the
time that the British Columbia courts would be compelled
to refuse to accept jurisdiction in suits based on damage to
land situated outside of the province.'8 3
There is no reason to believe that the situation has changed since
those opinions were expressed in the late 1920's.184

B. United States Statutes
As an alternative to suing at common law an injured party
could bring an action against a foreign polluter under one of several United States federal and state statutes. This section will
focus upon federal laws under which proceedings could be
brought by Canadians against American polluters and state legislation allowing private citizens to sue out-of-state polluters to protect environmental quality within the state. Because state legislation and certain of the federal statutes specifically allow suits to
abate pollution, they offer perhaps the best possibility for enjoining
defendant's activity of any statutory or common law basis for relief.
180. See Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39 (N.B. 1936);
Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, Min. and Devel. Co., Ltd., [1925] 1 D.L.R. 978
(B.C. 1925); Willis, supra note 120; and A. DICEY & J. MoRRis, supra note 119,
at 150. But see cases cited in note 165 supra.
181. Albert v. Fraser Companies Ltd., id.; Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber,
Min.and Devel. Co., Ltd., id.
182. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 684 (1941).
183. Read, supra note 7, at 222-23.
184. See Landis, supra note 14:
The present law is unsatisfactory. Where pollution of waters on
one side of a provincial boundary in interprovincial waters or on one
side of the international boundary in the Great Lakes Boundary Waters causes damage to land under or adjoining the waters on the other
side of either boundary . . . if [Moambique, Albert and Boslund] are

followed, the courts would not have jurisdiction to try civil actions for
damages or an injunction based on such pollution or even for damage
to personal property or health indirectly caused by such pollution.
Id. at 130 n.294.
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They also allow suit without proof that defendant caused injury
to plaintiff and would thus allow the litigant to avoid one of the
most potentially hazardous pitfalls of this type of litigation.' 8 5 The
first federal statute considered offers a possible jurisdictional avenue
for Canadian plaintiffs seeking monetary relief.
Title 28, section 1350 of the United States Code'1 6 is perhaps most notable for its obscurity and lack of utilization T since
it was first enacted in 1789. It provides simply:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' 88
On the basis of its terms, this law is apparently intended to afford
injured aliens access to United States forums which they would not
otherwise have, but only in cases where the tort they complain
of violates the law of nations or a United States treaty. Where
such a violation occurred, this section would seemingly overcome any obstacles presented by normal jurisdictional rules.
While courts may not agree upon precisely what is comprehended by the term "the law of nations," pollution originating in
the United States which caused injury in Canada would violate a
widely recognized rule formulated by the Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal8 9 regarding trans-boundary pollution:
[U]nder the priciples of international law, as well as of
the law of the United States, no State has the right to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.190
185. See note 14 supra.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970).
187. This provision's infrequent use as a jurisdictional basis was noticed by
one court in 1961: "Despite its age, only six cases and one opinion of [an]
Attorney General ...

are cited in the annotations."

Abdul-Rahman Omar

Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D. Md. 1961).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970).
189.. The Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal was formed by the United
States and Canada under a special convention solely to deal with a dispute which
had arisen between a smelter in British Columbia and landowners in the state of
Washington. Convention with the Dominion of Canada relative to the establishment of a tribunal to decide questions of indemnity and future regime arising from
the operation of smelter at Trail, British Columbia, April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245
(1935), T.S. No. 893 (effective Aug. 3, 1935). See generally Read, supra
note 7.
190. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (1941), 35 AM.
J. INT'L L. 684, 713 (1941).
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Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed
Principle 21 of the Declaration on the Human Environment' 9 '
which affirms states' "responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ."I"
On the basis of one or both of
ment of other States ...
these statements of international legal principles, a United States
court could reasonably find that an American defendant allegedly
causing transnational pollution to the injury of a Canadian plainhave committed a tort in
tiff would, for jurisdictional purposes,
1 93
violation of the law of nations.
The statute provides secondly for federal court jurisdiction in
aliens' actions for torts which are violative of a treaty of the United
States. There are two treaties between the United States and Canada which would seem particularly well suited to the type of action
under consideration: the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty'94 and
the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement." 5 The former
embodies a specific prohibition against pollution of boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary to the injury of health
or property in the other country; 19 6 the latter, after expressing serious concern "about the grave deterioration of water quality on
each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing injury to
191. See note 346 infra.
192. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1.
193.

See Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (D. Pa.

1963), holding that for purposes of this section the "law of nations" may be
ascertained from the works of jurists writing on public laws, general usage and

practice of nations, or judicial decisions which recognize and enforce that law.
Cf. the Supreme Court's statements in United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S.
479 (1887), a case involving counterfeiting of foreign securities:

Whether the offense [tort] as defined is an offense against the law of
nations depends on the thing done, not on any declaration to that
effect by Congress.
Id. at 488.
The law of nations requires every national government to use
"due diligence" to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people
thereof ...

Id. at 494.

See also Khedivial Line v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49

(2d Cir. 1960); and Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857
(D. Md. 1961). There is a large body of writing dealing with the responsibility
of states in international law for pollution which affects other states. See
authorities cited in note 344 infra.
194. 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548 (effective May 13, 1910).

195. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Between the United States and
Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 7312 (effective April 15, 1972).
196. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No.
548 (effective May 13, 1910).
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health and property on the other side,11 97 reaffirms the countries'
"obligation not to pollute boundary waters .... '"'
To bring an action under the "treaty-violation" part of section 1350, a plaintiff would have to show first that his was a
"civil action. . . for a tort only" and second that the alleged tort
was "committed in violation of... a treaty of the United States."
A suit to recover damages or an injunction'9 9 for such injurious
actions as a nuisance or trespass committed by means of transnational pollution would qualify under the first requirement. As to
the second requirement, if plaintiffs injury was caused by water
pollution, the violation of both treaties would be manifest. While
trans-boundary air pollution is not specifically prohibited by the
terms of either treaty, the machinery set up by the 1909 Treaty
has been extensively utilized in working with air pollution problems.2"' The International Joint Commission created by the 1909
20 1
Treaty played an important role in the Trail Smelter Dispute
as well as investigating and reporting extensively upon air pollution
in the Detroit-Windsor area.20 2 It has also undertaken investigation of pollution from land based sources around the St. Clair and
Detroit Rivers and surveillance of transnational pollution along the
entire United States-Canadian border. 2 3 Despite this long history of joint efforts under the 1909 Treaty to control trans-boundary air pollution, however, the lack of an explicit prohibition
thereof would probably make it difficult for a court to find that
a private injury in Canada caused by air pollution from the United
States constituted "a tort . . . committed in violation of . . . a
treaty of the United States." Thus an action for air pollution in197. T.I.A.S. No. 7312, preamble (effective April 15, 1972).
198. Id.
199. A prayer for injunctive relief would not take such a case out of the category of a tort action. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857,
863 (D. Md. 1961).
200. For a description of Canadian-American cooperation under the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty in monitoring, remedying and controlling trans-boundary
air pollution, see Rempe, supra note 42.
201. See Read, supra note 7; and the summary of IJC Docket No. 25, Trail
Smelter Investigation, in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGEALD, supra note 63, at
137.
202. See the summary of IJC Docket No. 61, Air Pollution Reference, in
L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 63, at 183; IJC, REPORT ON
POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE (1960); IC, TERMINATION OF COMMISSION
ACTIVITIES ON VESSEL SMOKE SURVEILLANCE IN THE DETROIT RIVER AREA UNDER
THE 1949 Am POLLUTION REFERENCE (1967); and Rempe, supra note 42, at 142.
203. Rempe, id. at 143.
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jury would probably be better brought under the "law of nations"
portion of the statute.
A thorough analysis of possibilities for maintaining an action
under section 1350 is beyond the scope of this article, but it
would be well to note two of the few opinions which have dealt
with this statute, 20 4 and which bear significantly upon the type of
action under conisderation. The first is an opinion of Attorney
General Charles J. Bonaparte2 " which involved an 1889 treaty
with Mexico 20 6 relating to the Rio Grande where it forms the international boundary. That treaty had given the International Water Boundary Commission certain authority respecting questions
arising along the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers. Acting on a
Mexican complaint against an American company, the Commission found that the company had violated provisions of the treaty
by constructing works which changed the channel of the Rio
Grande. Mexican citizens had allegedly been injured by the
works, but the Commission was of the opinion that it did not have
jurisdiction under the treaty to provide relief. In response to a
request from the Secretary of State, Attorney General Bonaparte
delivered an opinion 2°7 concerning the Commission's findings.
The Attorney General noted in his analysis that the "authority of
the Commission under [the 18891 treaty is restricted to the determination of questions respecting the boundary alone, and does not
extend to the adjudication of private rights and liabilities."20,
He
emphasized, however, that the Mexicans would not be without
recourse: "As to indemnity for injuries which may have been
caused to citizens of Mexico, I am of opinion that existing statutes
provide a right of action and a forum."20' The Attorney General
204. The following decisions, although only tangentially relevant, are interesting for their application of the statute. In what seems to be the first reported
case brought under section 1350, a federal court sustained jurisdiction, relying at
least in part on that provision, in an action for restitution of Negro slaves which
were allegedly seized in violation of a treaty with France. Bolchos v. Darrel,
3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (D.C.S.C. 1795). And in a case of more recent
vintage, an action was allowed under section 1350 for defendant's withholding of a
child from the custody of its parent, which also defrauded Lebanese and American authorities and was thus in violation of the law of nations. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).

205.
206.
1890).
207.
208.

26 OP. AT'Y GEN. 250 (1907).
26 Stat. 1512 (1889), T.S. No. 232 (exchange of ratifications Dec. 24,
26 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 250 (1907).
Id. at 252 (emphasis added).

209. Id.
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cited the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as providing a forum
and that of 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as granting a right of action.21 0
To be contrasted with Attorney General Bonaparte's conclusions is an opinion rendered by federal district court judge Bonsai
in Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n.211 Plaintiff, a Canadian shipping company, alleged that
defendants set up unlawful picket lines around plaintiffs vessels
at various ports and wrongfully induced employees of dock and
stevedoring companies to refuse to unload plaintiff's ships. Jurisdiction was grounded, inter alia, upon the existence of a federal
question under 27 U.S.C. § 1350. Exactly how jurisdiction was
sought to be established under that provision does not appear in
the opinion, but plaintiff apparently argued that defendant's conduct violated the injunction of article I of the 1909 Treaty that
"navigation. . . shall forever continue free and open. . . to the
ships. . . of both countries equally." 2
The court did not question the propriety of plaintiff's reliance upon section 1350, and its
two-paragraph discussion of federal question jurisdiction under
that section does not reveal specifically how the defendant might
have violated the 1909 Treaty.21 3 The court simply quoted from
articles I and IX of the Treaty,21 4 declared that article IX provides "the specific remedy" which plaintiff should pursue by "seeking espousal of its claim by the Canadian Government and its
presentation to the International Joint Commission,"2 15 and concluded that
[t]he treaty having expressed the remedy to be pursued for
violations thereof by a special tribunal, the Court holds that
210. Id. at 252-53.
211. 33 F.R.D. 348 (D.C.N.Y. 1963).
212. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty art. I, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No.
548 (effective May 13, 1910).
213. 33 F.R.D. at 350.
214. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty arts. I and IX, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910),
T.S. No. 548 (effective May 13, 1910). Article I is concerned with maintaining
free and open navigation. The court quoted a portion of article IX as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties further agree that any other questions or matters of difference arising between them involving the rights,
obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other along the common frontier between the United
States and the Dominion of Canada shall be referred . . .to the Inter-

national Joint Commission for examination and report, whenever either
the Government of the United States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that such questions or matters of difference
be so referred."
33 F.R.D. at 350 (court's emphasis).
215. Id.
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no action lies in this Court for violation of the treaty (28
21
U.S.C. § 1350.). 6
Judge Bonsal apparently did not intend by this broad declaration that the court would not take jurisdiction of any actions for
a tort which happened to violate the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, because he went on to hold that defendant's alleged interference with the Canadian plaintiff's shipping business, "including
the . . .free operation of its ships on navigable waters . . . 217
was sufficient to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon the federal
district court. The import of this statement appears instead to
be that since the 1909 Treaty expressly provides for violations to
be referred to the International Joint Commission by the two governments, the court had no jurisdiction over an action for a tort
committed in violation of the treaty. The court's discussion of section 1350 is thus somewhat confused, since plaintiff did not sue
because defendant violated the treaty, but because defendant allegedly committed a tort against plaintiff; the alleged treaty violation was merely used as a possible jurisdictional basis as contemplated by section 1350. Query whether the same conclusion respecting jurisdiction under the section would have been reached
had not the clear alternative jurisdictional ground been available.
It is also unclear whether article IX would offer plaintiff
a "specific remedy" since that article only grants the IJC investigative and reporting powers.21
Canada might conceivably espouse plaintiff's claim, 219 as the court suggests, but in light of the
types of questions which have been submitted to the IJC in the
past, 220 it is doubtful that the Canadian government would refer
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 63, ch. 4, at 38-52.
219. However, the United States would presumably be entitled, under general rules of international law, to insist that plaintiff first exhaust all remedies
available under Canadian law. See 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 769-76.
It is doubtful that this case would be resolved by "transmuting the claims by
individuals . . . into claims sounding in international tort ......
by one country
against the other, as was done in the Trail Smelter Dispute. Read, supra note 7,
at 223. The following words of Chief Justice Waite in New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1882), would seem worthy of consideration in this
regard:
There is not a principle of international law which makes it the duty
of one nation to assume the collection of the claims of its citizens
against another nation, if the citizens themselves have ample means of
redress without the intervention of their Government.
220. See I.C Docket summaries in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra
note 63, at 65 et seq. In a pollution case, it is perhaps even more doubtful that
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this claim to the Commission either for an investigation and nonbinding report under article IX or for a final decision under article X.121 Rather, if the claim were espoused at all, it would
most likely be handled directly through diplomatic channels.22 2
But in any case, it is doubtful that the existence of the dispute
settlement mechanisms under the 1909 Treaty would preclude a
pollution suit. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a recent case in which the
State of Ohio sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original juris-

diction in a suit against a Canadian company to abate pollution
of Lake Erie, made the following remarks on the effect of the 1909

Treaty:
The suit is not precluded by the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 . . . . Article 4 provides that the "boundary waters . . . shall not be polluted on either side to the
there is no
injury of health or property on the other." 2But
3
machinery for direct enforcement of Article 4.2
The International Joint Commission was not considered as an alternative forum by the Supreme Court in that case.
Finally, the opinion rendered by Attorney General Bonaparte
in an analogous case affords guidance for section 1350 suits
brought for torts in violation of the 1909 Treaty. The International Joint Commission, like the International Water Boundary

Commission, was not formed for "the adjudication of private rights
and liabilities, ' 224 and the IJC's judicial powers are defined by
such a reference would be made:
[W]ith a few exceptions such as the Trail Smelter reference, the terms
of such references have been broad rather than specific, with their thrust
clearly toward technical assessment and the recommendation of ongoing and future-directed proposals rather than the determination of legal responsibility and specific remedies for past treaty violations.
Bilder, supra note 27, at 515.
221. Article X apparently has yet to be used. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD,supra note 63, at 55.
222. On the "desirability of handling international pollution problems
through cooperative procedures" see Bilder, supra note 27, at 517 n.176, and the
authorities therein cited.
223. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas went on to consider articles 8 and 10 and concluded that they presented no problems either. It was contended by Dow
Chemical Company that the action would raise issues involving foreign policy
and external affairs which would divest the Court of jurisdiction. Brief of
Dow (U.S.) in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 34. But in
an amicus curiae brief, the United States took the position that the 1909
Treaty was not self-executing and would not preclude exercise of jurisdiction.
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-18. The Court therefore did
not view the IJC to constitute an alternative forum.
224. See note 181 supra, and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/18

46

McCaffrey: Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations
TRANs-BOUNDARY

POLLUTION INJURIES

article VIII of the 1909 Treaty to extend only to cases involving
certain uses of boundary waters which require the Commission's
Moreover, a pollution action would involve facts
approval.2 2
more closely cognate to those in the Attorney General's opinion
than were those in the Upper Lakes Shipping case, and it is submitted that a court could properly distinguish the latter case in
a pollution action on this and the other grounds discussed above.
While section 1350 allows aliens a general right of access to

United States courts, four other federal laws specifically allow private individuals the right to initiate litigation against polluters and
governmental agencies. These are the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970,226 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972,227 the Noise Control Act of 1972228 and the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.229 The first three statutes generally allow
persons23 ° to bring civil actions on their own behalf directly
against alleged violators of federal standards or administrative orders. 231 They grant federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce
the standards allegedly violated without regard to the amount
in controversy, 32 and typically provide that the action must be
brought where the source of the pollution is located.23 3 The
225. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 63, at 55. See also
the summary of IJC Docket No. 31, id. at 142, in which the only application by
a private party not to have been brought through the applicant's government was
denied by the IJC for lack of jurisdiction. The IJC's judicial powers do not encompass pollution cases. See Waite, The International Joint Commission-Its
Practiceand Its Impact on Land Use, 13 BUFF. L. REv. 93, 97 (1963).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
227. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505 (Oct. 18, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 4825, 4913-14.

228. Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 12 (Oct. 27, 1972), 1972 U.S.
An.

CODE CONG.

&

NEws 6064.

229. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
230. None of these statutes appear to bar suit by an alien. The Clean Air
Amendments, e.g., define "person" simply as, inter alia, "an individual. . ....
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970).
231. For example, the Clean Air Amendments provide:
. . . any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and
(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
(2)
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is
not discretionary with the Administrator.
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1).
232. See, e.g., id. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
233. See, e.g., id. § 1857h-2(c)(1) (1970).
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Rivers and Harbors Act states in section 411 that "the person
or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction. .. ."
of anyone wrongfully depositing refuse into navigable waters shall

receive half the fine recovered in such a criminal action.

Al-

though this section does not specifically mention any right of the
informer to sue the polluter directly, such a right to bring a qui tam
action has been implied.23 4 In these actions, plaintiff sues for himself and for the government seeking half the penalty provided by
the statute. While this law is thus a potentially effective2 weapon,
35
its effectiveness to allow qui tam actions remains uncertain.
Various states, of which only Michigan23 6 and Minnesota 8 '
are pertinent here, 238 have enacted legislation allowing private
persons to bring civil actions directly against polluters.2 3 9 Like
234. See generally, CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMM. OF
THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91st Cong., 24 Sess., Qui TAM ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST POLLUTERS OF
THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print 1970).
235. Recent attempts to bring qui tam actions under this statute have been
frustrated by holdings that the informer can collect his moiety of the penalty only
after the Government has prosecuted the alleged violator. See, e.g., Connecticut
Action Now v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 3 ERC 1934 (2d Cir. 1972);
Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 2 ERC 1692 (N.D.
Ala. 1971); and Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302, 2 ERC 1298 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See generally
Comment, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water
Pollution, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 188-194 (1971); Note, Private Cause of Action
under the Rivers and HarborsAppropriationAct of 1899 for Injury to the Ecology
of Navigable Waters, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (1972); Note, Environmental LawThe Refuse Act and the Qui Tam Action (Bass Anglers Sportsman Society of
America, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 5th Cir. 1971), 46 TUILANE L. REV. 1023 (1972).
236. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS
The portion of this Act which allows state
ANN. §§ 691.1201-07 (1970).
courts to direct adoption of adequate pollution standards where existing standards
are found to be inadequate has been held to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, at least insofar as it pertains to motor vehicle emissions. Roberts v. Michigan, 2 ERC 1612 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971).
237. Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14
(1971).
238. Other states with such legislation which are not located on the international boundary are Connecticut, Florida, Indiana and Massachusetts.
239. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act allows four types of actions:
(1)
actions to enforce existing environmental quality standards, (2)
actions to enjoin conduct which materially adversely affects the environment, (3) actions involving intervention into administrative proceedings
or judicial review thereof where the conduct at issue is alleged to have
caused pollution, and (4) actions challenging the adequacy of state environmental quality standards or regulations.
Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 575, 576
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the federal laws, these statutes do not require plaintiff to have suffered any special personal injury; unlike the federal laws, they create a general right of action in state courts "for declaratory and
equitable relief . . . for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources . . . from pollution, impairment or destruction."2 40 An important difference between these two state laws

is that the Michigan act on its face allows "any person"'2 41 to sue
without restriction as to residence, while the Minnesota act limits
the class of plaintiffs to "any person residing within the state

but allows state courts to "exercise personal jurisdiction
over any foreign corporation or any nonresident individual
....

"242

... -924

Hence a Canadian citizen could presumably bring an

action under the former law against a Michigan polluter, and a
Minnesota resident is specifically allowed by the latter statute to

sue anyone who "[c]ommits or threatens to commit any act outside the state which would impair, pollute or destroy the air, water,
land or other natural resources located within the state . .
"244

This legislation thus provides clear possibilities for injunctive relief against foreign polluters, although proving a causal connection between defendant's activity and harm within the state might
prove troublesome under the Minnesota statute.2 45
IV.

SUING AT THE PLACE OF THE INJURY:
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Among the advantages of bringing an action in the jurisdic(1972) (footnotes omitted). For additional analyses of this type of legislation,
see Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription
for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY L. Q. 561 (1971); Sax and Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 1003 (1972); and Cramton and Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental
Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 ECOLOGY L. Q. 407 (1972). A bill similar to this
state legislation is pending in the United States Congress. See Cramton & Boyer,
id., discussing S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and the companion bill, H.R.
8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
240. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (1970).
The comparable
Minnesota provision is identical to the Michigan provision quoted except that "or"
is substituted for "and" both times the latter appears.
241. MICH.CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 691.1202(1) (1970).
242. MINN.STAT. § 1168.03, subdiv. 1.
243. Id. § 116B.11, subdiv. 1. See the discussion of state "long-arm" statutes in part IV, A. infra.
244. MINN. STAT. § 116B.11, subdiv. 1(b).
245. On the difficulty of establishing causation, see Landis, supra note 14,
at 129-31.
That writer advocates creation of civil causes of action for
trans-boundary pollution in violation of article IV of the 1909 Treaty. Id. at 130.
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tion where the injury was sustained are that such an action would
be more convenient to the plaintiff than suing in defendant's country, it would avoid any bias due to parochial factors at the place
of the act, and it would not run afoul of the local action rule.246
Subject matter jurisdiction over suits against foreign polluters
would not be defeated in either Canada or the United States because the act complained of occurred outside the jurisdiction.
This is a settled point in the United States,2 47 and the same result
would appear to follow in Canada by application of the rule in
Phillips v. Eyre248 to a pollution action. That case held that a
suit may be brought in England for an allegedly wrongful act committed abroad if only two conditions are met:
First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would
have been actionable if committed in England . . .. Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by the law of
249
the place where it was done.
An allegedly wrongful act causing pollution injury in Canada would
appear to satisfy both criteria unless defendant's actions were
"justifiable" under a United States statute or regulation.2 50
As to personal jurisdiction, however, it will often be the case
that plaintiff cannot effect service of summons upon defendant or
his agent within the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred. The
following discussion will therefore assume that defendant can only
246. See part HI, A. supra.

247. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
where Judge L. Hand stated:
[I]t is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that

has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and
these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.
Id. at 443. See also Strassheirn v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); Lamar v. U.S.,
240 U.S. 60 (1916); California Dev. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co., 172 F. 792
(9th Cir. 1909); and RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF
THE UNrrED STATES § 18 (1962):
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if...

(a)

the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent

elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems ....

Id.
248. [1870] 6 Q.B. 1.
249. Id. at 28-29. See generally A. DICEY & J. MoRRIs,

919, et seq.
250. But a lawful activity may constitute a nuisance.

supra note 119, at

Sohns v. Jensen,

11 Wis. 2d 449, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960); Hasslinger v. Hartland, 324 Wis. 201,

290 N.W. 647 (1940).
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be served with summons in his own country, and that he is served
in accordance with the rules of the forum. Although extraterritorial service of process was unknown at common law, 251 it

is now possible by statute in certain situations in both Canada 252 and
the United States. 2 5 ' In order to isolate critical enforcement issues, it will be further supposed for the purposes of this discussion that defendant elects to ignore the foreign court's proceedings and judgment is rendered for plaintiff. This of course means
that the court would lack effective power to grant an injunction,
254
and this section will therefore deal only with actions for damages.
251. See the statement of Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Maybee, 243 U.S.
90, 91 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
252. Extraterritorial service of summons is generally allowed in Canadian
Provinces pursuant to statutes modeled after England's Order 11 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Judicature, [1962] 3 Stat. Instr. 2529, 2552 (No. 2145).
Order 11 is permissive and discretionary, and plaintiff must obtain authorization
from a court before he can serve the writ of summons on an absent defendant
pursuant to the statute's special rules. The relevant part of Order 11 provides
as follows:
Principal cases in which service of writ out of jurisdiction is permissible
1. (1) Subject to [certain provisions], service of a writ, or
notice of a writ, out of the jurisdiction is permissible with the leave of
the Court in the following cases, that is to say(h) if the action begun by the writ is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction ....
253. Service of process on an absent defendant is generally allowable in
the United States pursuant to non-resident motorist statutes, "long-arm" statutes,
and their progeny. See, e.g., Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417
F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); and Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927). Many of the statutes allow service upon an absent defendant who commits a tortious act out of the jurisdiction which has consequences within the jurisdiction. See, e.g., the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act, MINN. STAT. § 116B.11, subdiv. 1(b) (1971), allowing state courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants who cause environmentally
harmful consequences within the state; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 302(3) (McKinney
1963), which empowers a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
a defendant who commits a tortious act outside New York which causes
injury within New York; and the similar Ohio long-arm statute, pursuant to
which the Ohio Attorney General is seeking to establish personal jurisdiction
over Dow Chemical Corp. of Canada, discussed in note 266 infra. See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
254. If defendant appeared, jurisdictional considerations would not prevent
the court from granting injunctive relief. See A. DICEY & J. Mouus, supra note
119, at 203; New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931);
Beale, suprla note 79, at 295; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 53, comment c:
The courts have shown greater readiness to enjoin action in another
state than to order an act to be done there. . . . Generally speaking,
such relief will be granted whenever acts are threatened which would
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It will first review generally the possibility in the United States and

Canada of establishing in personam jurisdiction over an absent defendant in a transnational pollution action, and will proceed to
consider the enforceability in defendant's country of a judgment
obtained in such an action. The discussion will proceed upon the
hypothesis that the defendant's only contact with the forum is plain-

tiff's pollution injury.
A.

Statutes Allowing ExtraterritorialService of Process

1. Suits by Americans in the United States-It is generally
accepted in the United States that a state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over an individual who produces effects within
the state by acts done elsewhere.25
Service of summons on a
defendant outside the state must be effected in a manner designed
to afford him adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard,
as prescribed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 256 The absent defendant
over whom jurisdiction is asserted has normally undertaken some
kind of voluntary relationship with the state, such as driving
subject the plaintiff to irreparable damage or when the demands of
fairness and convenience so require ...
In California Development Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co. (The Salton Sea
Cases), 172 F. 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 215 U.S. 603 (1909), the decision of
a California federal court enjoining a Mexican company from causing further
injury to plaintiff's land in California was upheld. That decree required the
performance of positive acts in Mexico by the defendant, who was before the
court, but the court took pains to emphasize that the Mexican company was
merely a creature of a California defendant company, and that the latter in
reality controlled the works in Mexico.
However, the court may be reluctant to exercise this power because of enforcement difficulties and because an injunction may interfere with foreign regulatory efforts. See the court's rationale in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956), set forth in note 16 supra.
As to enforcement in the United States of foreign judgments ordering or
enjoining acts, the Restatement states in comment g to § 102: "A valid decree
rendered in a foreign nation will usually be recognized in the United States
."

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONFLICT

OF LAWS

§ 102, comment g.

255. See id. § 37, at 156: such exercise must be reasonable in light of the
nature of the effects and the individual's relationship with the particular jurisdiction.
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See cases cited in note 253 supra. As to
actually effecting service outside the United States, see Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
13 AM. J. COMP. L. 612, 620 (1964); H. STEINER & D. VAGT, supra note
106, at 666-69; and Smit, International Cooperation in Civil Litigation:
Some Observations on the Roles of International Law and Reciprocity, 1962
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 137 (1962).
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doing business 2 5 -- even minimally 259 -within it, or
260
placing a product in the "normal distributive channels of trade"
which might be used within it. 261 The quantum of purposefulness required of the defendant in order to establish this relationship is constantly eroding. 26 2 Many state statutes allow extraterritorial service of process solely on the basis of defendant's commission of an act outside the state which has harmful consequences
26 4
within the state. 2 3 The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
specifically authorizes state courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or
any nonresident individual . . . if . . . the foreign corporation or nonresident individual:
through it,

257

(b) Commits or threatens to commit any act outside
the state which would impair, pollute or destroy the air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the
state ....265
257. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
258. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
259. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (jurisdiction based on one life insurance contract, entered into by mail, with a California domiciliary).
260. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1969). See the discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 268-75 infra.
261. Id.
262. This erosion may be said to be progressing concomitantly with, and
because of, the constant expansion of commerce, transportation and communication. See the United States Supreme Court's analysis of this trend in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
263. See note 253 supra. Two other types of statutes have been held
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over nonresidents where only the injury occurs in
the state. These predicate jurisdiction either on commission of a "tortious act"
within the state, e.g., Illinois (Gray v. American Radiator & Std. San. Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).), Iowa (Williams v. Vick Chemical
Corp., 279 F. Supp. 833 (D. Iowa 1967).); New York (Johnson v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 22 App. Div. 2d 138, 254 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1964), afl'd 18
N.Y.2d 933, 277 N.Y.S.2d 136, 223 N.E.2d 562 (1964).), and Washington
(Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Golden Gate Hop
Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965),
cert. den. 382 U.S. 1025 (1966).) or on commission of a tort, "in whole or in
part" within the state, e.g., Iowa (Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc.,
257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965).), Minnesota (Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).), and Missouri (Higgenbotham v. United Iron & Metal Co., 228 F. Supp. 513 (D. Mo. 1964).
264. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14 (1971).
For a discussion of this and
similar legislation, see text accompanying notes 236-45 supra.
265. Id., § 116B.11, subdiv. 1.
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In view of the strong state interest in protecting the health and
general welfare of its citizens, it would appear entirely consistent
with procedural due process requirements, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, to assert jurisdiction over a Canadian defendant
entirely on the basis of his actions in Canada-such as emitting
pollutants into the air or water-which endanger the health or welfare of a state's citizens.2 66 This view is supported by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
§ 37. CausingEffects in State by Acts Done Elsewhere
a. Rationale The state may exercise judicial jurisdiction
over the defendant if the effects which could have been anticipated and which actually occurred are of a sort highly
dangerous to persons or things. This is so even though the
26 7
defendant has no other relationshipto the state.

266. If a large number of the state's citizens suffer injury from pollution
emanating from Canada a public nuisance action by the state attorney general
would be the appropriate remedy. For discussions of whether a nuisance will be
deemed public or private see Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REv. 997 (1966); Note, supra note 37, at 738-44. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 144, at 591.
The State of Ohio, in its current litigation against, inter alia, Dow Chemical
of Canada, Ltd. (Dow Canada) [State of Ohio v. BASF Wyandotte Chemicals
Corporation, et at., No. 904571 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Filed March 22,
1972).] to abate mercury pollution of Lake Erie, has alleged that Ohio state
courts have jurisdiction over Dow Canada on the basis of one or both parts of
Ohio's long-arm statute. That law empowers the state courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction where there has been either (1) commission of a tortious act
within the state, or (2) commission of a tortious act outside the state which
gives rise to injuries within the state, or where defendant has business contacts
with the state. The United States Supreme Court declined to exercise original
jurisdiction over the action, [Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493
(1971).] and the case is currently pending in the state court in Cuyohoga
County, Ohio. Two of the corporate defendants, Dow Chemical Company
(Dow U.S.) and Dow Canada attempted to remove the suit to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, but on June 13, 1972, the federal district court remanded the case back to the Ohio state court on motion of Ohio.
Following remand, Dow Canada moved to dismiss on the ground that, inter alia,
the court lacked jurisdiction. Dow Canada's motion was held in abeyance pending answers to Ohio's interrogatories of Dow U.S. and Dow Canada which are
designed to determine whether the Ohio court has jurisdiction over Dow Canada
under Ohio's long-arm statute. Letter from Richard C. Brahm, Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio, to Stephen McCaffrey, December 7, 1972, on file
with the California Western International Law Journal. See generally Woods
and Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes
on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 691 (1970).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 at 156, 158
(1971) (emphasis added). Section 37 itself states:
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The recent case of Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth2 6 8 illustrates how far a United States court is willing to go
-in terms of both defendant's relationship with the forum and
the distance the Court will reach out to bring defendant before it
in order to provide a forum for the residents of its state. In that
case, plaintiff brought a products liability action in Hawaii against
an English defendant, establishing personal jurisdiction pursuant to
a Hawaii long-arm statute allowing assertion of jurisdiction over
any person who commits a tortious act within the state. Defendant
claimed, inter alia, that it had not committed a tortious act within
the state, since the allegedly negligent manufacture of the coach
body in question took place in England. The court brushed the
contention aside, declaring:
We do not regard it as offensive to fair play or substantial justice 269 or an undue burden on foreign trade to
require a manufacturer to defend his product wherever he
himself has placed it, either directly or through the normal
distributive channels of trade. If it is clearly foreseeable as
a result of trade with a foreign state that injury from a defective product (if it occurs) would occur in that state, the
judghardship of defending the product in that state in our
270
ment must be assumed as an attribute of foreign trade.
The occurrence of the injury in the forum state was far less
foreseeable in this case than would be true in most transnational
pollution situations, 271 and the hardship to defendant of apA state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect
to any one cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature
of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state make the
exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
268. 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
269. The phrase "traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice"
was first used in this context by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 320 (1945) (footnote added).
270. 417 F.2d at 235. The court laid the foundation for this position by
following an interpretation of an identical Illinois statute in Gray v. American
Radiator & Std. San. Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) that the
words "tortious act" do not require the doing of some act in the forum state.
417 F.2d at 233.
271. It has been recognized that any pollution emitted into the air or water
on one side of the Canada-United States boundary increases the likelihood of

injury to health or property on the other.

See, e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL

JOINT

COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BouNDARY WATERS 5 (1918):

[W]hile pollution which has a transboundary effect must in consequence
of the obligation resting on both countries under the [1909 Boundary
Waters] treaty be distinguished from pollution which has not such an
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pearing in an action half way around the world is far greater
than would be involved in an action across the border in a contiguous country. The underlying rationale of Duple, combined
with the policy expressed by the Restatement, offers guidance for
determining whether a nonresident polluter may be subjected to
the jurisdiction of a state in which he caused injury. Thus in a
transnational pollution case, it would not be offensive to "our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice"2 72 to require a Canadian polluter to defend the effects of his activity if
(1) it was clearly foreseeable that, as a result of such activity, injury could occur within that state, 27 and (2) "the effects which
could have been anticipated and which actually occurred are of
a sort highly dangerous to persons or things."27' 4 It might be stated
as a corollary to the Duple decision that any hardship involved
in defending such an action must be assumed as an attribute of
conducting an activity which pollutes shared international resources. 27 5 The tremendous growth of economic activity which
lead to the abolition of the territoriality principle of in personam
jurisdiction 2 70 has given birth to rampant interstate pollution and
will very likely be recognized to be no less cogent a basis for extraterritorial service than economic activity.
effect, the distinction is, from a practical standpoint, highly technical
and artificial.
Id.; and Landis, supra note 14.

After quoting from a report to the International

Joint Commission on the pollution of Lakes Erie and Ontario, [Report to the
International Joint Commission on the Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario,
and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River 7 (1969)] Mr. Landis
states:
These findings that any major source of pollution on the Ontario
side contributes directly or indirectly to the 'generally degraded condi-

tion' of the lakes, and that this degraded condition causes injury to
health and property on both sides of the line do not require any causal
connexion between a waste input on the Ontario side and a specific
injury on the American side.
Landis, id. at 129.
272. See note 269 supra.
273.

Cf. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th

Cir. 1969).
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 at 158 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that an Ohio court
could properly exercise jurisdiction over a Canadian defendant who allegedly
dumped mercury into Lake Erie on the Canadian side causing injury on the
American side. See the quote from Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401
U.S. 393 (1971) in text accompanying note 279 infta.
275. Cf. the quote from Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417
F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1969) in text accompanying note 270 supra.
276. See note 262 supra.
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A significant distinction between a transnational pollution
case and most cases in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is asserted is that the injury caused by a foreign polluter does not
"arise out" of at least minimal activities in the forum state.177 But
a dictum delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp.z 78 suggests that jurisdiction may properly be asserted over an absent defendant conducting activities unrelated to
the forum state if those activities produce harmful effects within the
state:
The courts of Ohio, under modern principles of the scope
of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, have a claim
as compelling as any that can be made out for this Court to
exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant controversy, and
they would decide it under the same common law of nuisance upon which our determination would have to rest. In
essence, the State has charged Dow Canada and Wyandotte
with the commission of acts, albeit beyond Ohio's territorial
boundaries, that have produced and, it is said, continue to
produce disastrous effects within Ohio's own domain. While
this Court, and doubtless Canadian courts, if called upon
to assess the validity of any decree rendered against either
Dow Canada or Wyandotte, would be alert to ascertain
whether the judgment rested upon an even-handed application of justice, it is unlikely that we would totally deny
Ohio's competence to act if the allegations made here are
proved true.2 79
Thus it appears that the Supreme Court would, under proper circumstances, sustain a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident polluter where the only jurisdictional nexus with the state was
the harmful effect of defendant's activity.Y
2. Suits by Canadians in Canada-As in the United States,
the fact that an injury sustained within the forum was caused by
277. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
278. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
279. Id. at 500-01, citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 495); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

18 (1962).
280. See Comment, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RPTR. 10038, 10039-40 (1971).
Cf. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969),
where defendant "never registered to do business in Hawaii, has never had a representative present there or owned property there." Id. at 234.
UNITED STATES §
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an act outside the forum will not oust a Canadian court of jurisdiction.2s Service of the writ of summons upon an absent defendant is generally possible in the Canadian Provinces pursuant
to statutes modelled after Order 11 of the English Rules of the
Supreme Court.2"" The court's power to permit extraterritorial

service of the writ is discretionary, however, and plaintiff must
apply for an order giving leave to issue the writ of summons
28 3
before he can effect service out of the jurisdiction.

One of the cases in which extraterritorial service of the writ
of summons is allowed by these Order 11-type statutes is where
"the action begun by the writ is founded on a tort committed within
the jurisdiction .... *284 Although there is some question 2 in
15
multiple contact cases as to where the locus delicti commissi is,
Canadian case law indicates that it would probably be deemed
286
to be the place of injury in a trans-boundary pollution case.
If so, extraterritorial service of the writ of summons would be
proper under the "tort committed within the jurisdiction" requirement. The remainder of this subsection will consider whether an

activity in the United States which causes an injury in Canada by
means of air or water pollution may be deemed a tort committed
within the jurisdiction in which the injury was sustained for the
281. See, e.g., Herbert v. de Camillis (1963), 44 W.L.R. 1, 41 D.L.R. (2d)
494 (B.C. 1963); Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. 1952);
Original Blouse Co. v. Bruck Mills, Ltd., 42 D.L.R. (2d) 174 (B.C. 1963);
Composers, Authors and Publishers Assn. of Canada v. Int'l Good Music Inc.,
37 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (Can. S. Ct. 1963); Bata v. Bata, [1948] W.N. 366 (Eng.
C.A. 1948). But see Abbot-Smith v. Governors of Univ. of Toronto, 45 D.L.R.
(2d) 672 (N.S. 1964).
282. [1962] 3 Stat. Instr. 2529, 2552 (No. 2145). See note 351 supra for
a discussion of this statute. As to effecting service of foreign process in the
United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1970), providing for cooperation by United
States district courts with foreign tribunals in accomplishing service upon defendants in the United States.
283. See generally G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 79-90 (7th
ed. 1965); and Collins, Some Aspects of Service Out of the Jurisdictionin English Law, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 656 (1972).
284. [1962] 3 Stat. Instr. 2529, 2552, § 1. (1) (h) (No. 2145).
285. See text accompanying notes 292-304 infra. See generally G. CHESHIRE, supra note 119, at 278 et seq.; A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 119,

at 947 et. seq.; A.

EHRENZWEIG,

PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

135 et seq.

(1964); G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 238-39 (1971); Gerber, Tort
Liability in the Conflict of Laws, Part 1, 40 Aus. L. J. 44; Part 2, 40 Aus. L. J.
73 (1966); Webb & North, Thoughts on the Place of Commission of a NonStatutory Tort, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1314 (1965).
286. See text accompanying notes 292-304 infra.
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purpose of allowing service upon the American defendant.
An examination of the leading Canadian, English and Australian cases dealing with the question of where the tort is commit-

ted in a multiple contact situation clearly reveals a consistent pattern: torts involving some element of intent are deemed to be
committed where the injurious effect is suffered,"8 7 while the tort
of negligence is regarded as being committed where the defendant's duty was breached,2 88 which is often at the place of the
act.289 This practice of the Commonwealth courts of asserting jurisdiction in cases with foreign elements only when there are con-

tacts with the jurisdiction which defendant has affirmatively made290
appears very much akin to the procedure which has been developed by United States courts to assure that assertion of jurisdiction
over an absent defendant will not offend the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.29 1 If the above-described pattern
extrapolated from Commonwealth cases is reasonably accurate,
extraterritorial service of the writ of summons would appear
proper in trans-boundary pollution cases founded on nuisance or
trespass theories, since both involve purposeful conduct on the
part of the defendant.2 92 A brief review of apposite Common-

wealth cases will help to clarify and substantiate this point.
287. See Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. 1952) (defamation); Original Blouse Co. Ltd. v. Bruck Mills Ltd., 42 D.L.R. (2d) 174 (B.C.
1963) (fraud); Composers, Authors and Publishers Assn. of Canada v. Int'l
Good Music Inc., 37 D.L.R. (2d) I (Can. S. Ct. 1963) (breach of copyright);
Hubert v. De Camillis, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 494 (B.C. 1963) (defamation); Bata v.
Bata, [1948] W.N. 366 (Eng. C.A. 1948) (defamation).
288. See Thompson v. The Distillers Co. (Bio Chemicals), Ltd., 88 W.N.
(Pt. 2) 219 (N.S.W. C.A. 1968) (negligence; place of injury).
289. See Abbot-Smith v. Governors of Univ. of Toronto, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 672
(N.S. 1964) (negligence; place of act); George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp., [1944] K.B. 432 (C.A. 1944) (negligence; place of
act). But cf. Thompson v. The Distillers Co. (Bio Chemicals), Ltd., 88 W.N.
(Pt. 2) 219 (N.S.W. C.A. 1968) (negligence; place of injury).
290. "Contacts" here is not meant to be synonymous with "effects." Compare the Monro case, [1944] K.B. 432 (C.A. 1944), where the court did not
take jurisdiction over a negligence action for injury within the jurisdiction,
with the Thompson case, 88 W.N. (Pt. 2) 219 (N.S.W. C.A. 1968), where
jurisdiction was exercised in a negligence action for an injury within the court's
jurisdiction. Rather, the courts seem to look for whether (1) defendant has
caused effects within the jurisdiction through his purposeful conduct; or (2) he
carries on activities which are substantially certain to produce effects within the
jurisdiction; or (3) he has breached a duty in the jurisdiction owed to plaintiff.
291. See text accompanying notes 255-62 supra.
292. Most nuisances are intentional. W. PROSSER, supra note 144, at 574.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1973

59

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1973], Art. 18
CALIFORNA WEsTRN INTEmATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 3

Four Canadian cases involving public 2 93 or private 29 4 communications from the United States to Canada upon which recipients based causes of action in Canadian courts offer useful insights. These cases demonstrate the willingness of Canadian
courts to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over absent defendants
who could have foreseen that their acts might have harmful consequences in Canada.29 5 Perhaps representative is Jenner v. Sun
Oil Co.,296 where plaintiff, who lived and carried on business in
Ontario, brought an action based on allegedly defamatory statements broadcast by a radio station in the United States. Defendant challenged an ex parte order giving leave to issue a writ of
summons for service out of Ontario, issued under a statute allowing service ex juris in case of "a tort committed within Ontario. 2 97
In arguing that the tort, if any, was committed within Ontario,
defendant relied on two cases in which injury within the jurisdiction was caused by negligence outside the jurisdiction.29 s
The court dismissed defendant's contention, reasoning that
it did not regard that class of cases as being decisive authority in
the instant case. The principle announced in the leading English
case of Bata v. Bata,299 where defamatory letters were written in
Switzerland and published in London, was deemed controlling.
In that decision, Scott, L.J., who also wrote the majority opinion in
the leading English negligence case relied upon by defendant,"'
held the tort to have been committed in England, since publication was the essence of actionable defamation. The Jenner court
applied this approach, also emphasizing that in deciding whether
to grant leave for issue of the writ, strict regard must be given to
the nature of the tort, the manner of its commission, and the re293. Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. 1952) (radio
broadcast); Composers, Authors and Publishers Assn. of Canada v. Int'l Good
Music Inc., 37 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (Can. 1963) (television broadcast).
294. Original Blouse Co. Ltd. v. Bruck Mills Ltd., 42 D.L.R. (2d) 174
(B.C. 1963) (letters and telephone calls); Hubert v. De Camillis, 41 D.L.R. (2d)
494 (B.C. 1963) (letters).

295. All four cases were decided under rules worded identically with the
English Order 11, quoted in note 252 supra.
296. [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. 1952).
297. Id. at 530.

298. George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp., [1944]
K.B. 432

(C.A.

1944); Anderson v. Nobels Explosive Co.,

12 D.L.R. 644

(1906).
299.

[1948] W.N. 366 (Eng. C.A. 1948).

300. George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp., [19441
K.B. 432 (C.A. 1944).
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suit in the jurisdiction. It was therefore held that the writ was
properly issued since radio broadcasts are made to be heard, the
hearing or publication-the "essence" of defamation-occurred in
Ontario, and defendant could reasonably foresee that the broadcast would be heard there.301
Following the courts' analysis in Bata and Jenner, for purposes of issuing the writ, the locus commissi of negligence would be
where the duty was breached, of nuisance, where the interference with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property occurred,
and of trespass, where the invasion of plaintiff's interest in the
exclusive possession of his land occurred. This approach helps
to explain the holdings in two leading negligence cases which
have sometimes been taken as holding that the tort occurs at the
place of the act. George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and
Chemical Corp.30 2 and Abbot-Smith v. Governors of University
of Toronto30 ' both involved an allegedly negligent manufacture
in one jurisdiction of a product which caused injury in another.
Both held that the tort was not committed at the place of injury.
But this is not to say that the tort was deemed committed at the
place of the act. The better view is expressed in the Australian
case of Thompson v. The Distillers Co. 30 4 in which a writ was
issued for service upon an English defendant who had allegedly
been negligent in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals. The New
South Wales Court of Appeal held that the cause of action had
arisen in Australia because the alleged breach of duty and damage
occurred there. The court reconciled its holding with Monro on
the following grounds: in Thompson, the duty involved was owed
to the ultimate consumer, and the court held specifically that this
duty was not breached until the product was supplied to her in
New South Wales. Monro, on the other hand, was a suit by a
retailer for losses incurred from compensating customers for injury they had suffered from defendant supplier's product. The
301. This case has also been taken for the proposition that, for purposes of
subject matter jurisdiction, this type of tort may be deemed to have been committed both where the act was done and where the effect was produced. See A.
DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 119, at 949.
302. [1944] K.B. 432 (C.A. 1944).
303. 45 D.L.R. (2d) 672 (N.S. 1964).
304. 88 W.N. (Pt. 2) 219 (N.S.W. C.A. 1968). See ANNUAL SURVEY OF
COMMONWEALTH LAW 1969 at 574 (1969).
Cf. the court's holding on the place

of the tort of negligence for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction in Smith v.
Southern Ry. Co., 136 Ky. 162, 123 S.W. 678 (Ky. App. 1909), discussed in

text accompanying notes 146-51 supra.
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supplier breached his duty to the retailer when he supplied the
products to him, and not when the retailer sold the products to
the ultimate consumers. Since the former event occurred in New
York, the fact that the latter event and the subsequent injury occurred in England was of no consequence, and the court accordingly held that the tort had been committed in New York.
These cases indicate that a Canadian court could, in the exercise of its discretion, properly give leave to issue a writ of summons for service outside of Canada in pollution cases based on nuisance or trespass theories, or in negligence suits where defendant's duty to plaintiff was alleged to have been breached in Canada.
B.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments

The extraterritorial effect to be accorded judgments is a
broad field which has been dealt with extensively. 0 5 This section will not attempt to deal with refinements but will review
principles of general applicability to determine the possibilities for
enforcement in each country of ex parte money judgments based
upon extraterritorial service of process as allowed by the rules of
the forum.
The requirements in each country for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments seem quite similar, as one would
expect in two legal systems with common roots and traditions. 30 6 A
principal requirement in both countries is that the foreign defendant be given fair and timely notice of the action"0 7 and that he
305. With respect to United States practice see, e.g., Reese, The Status in
this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1950);
Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 U.C.LA. L. REV. 44 (1962); and Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1935). See generally A. EHRENZWEIO, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1964).
Regarding Canadian
practice, see, e.g., Castel, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Personam and in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 17 McGILL
L. REV. 11 (1971); Nadelmann, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada,
38 CAN. B. REV. 68 (1960). See generally G. CHEsHmRE, supra note 283, at 535
et seq.; and A. DICEY & J. MoRRIS, supra note 119, ch. 10.

306. See generally Yntema, id.
307. Cf. Article 6 of the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 5 INT'L LEG.
MATERIALS 636 (1967):
Without prejudice to Article 5, a decision rendered by default shall
neither be recognized nor enforced unless the defaulting party received
notice of the institution of the proceedings in accordance with the law
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be accorded procedural due process throughout the proceedings.
Since the statutory conditions for assertion of personal jurisdiction
over absent defendants are substantially the same in many parts
of Canada and the United States,80 it would appear likely that
neither country's courts would decline to enforce judgments from
the other country on account of extraterritorial service in accordance with the latter country's requirements. 0
1. United States-With regard to United States law, the view
expressed above is supported by the case of Cherun v. Frishman81 ° in which an Ontario resident sued on a default judgment
which he had recovered in a mortgage foreclosure action against a
United States citizen in the Supreme Court of Ontario. Service
had been effected upon defendant Frishman personally in the
District of Columbia pursuant to an Ontario statute"' with a
Writ and Notice of Writ "fully apprising him of the Ontario pro312
ceedings and giving him an opportunity to contest them."
The federal district court, per Tamm, J., quoted the requirements for enforcing foreign judgments articulated in Hilton v.
Guyot 1 8 and continued:
On the same day of its decision in Hilton v. Guyot, the
Supreme Court decided a similar case arising out of an Ontario, Canada suit. In Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235
... . the Court found that under "the law of England, prevailing in Canada, a judgment rendered by an American court
under, like circumstances would be allowed full and conclusive effect," and therefore courts of the United States
should give the same effect to Canadian judgments provided,
of course, that the other conditions set forth in Hilton v.
3 14
Guyot are met.
Since the only condition questioned by defendant was the Ontario
court's jurisdiction over him, Judge Tamm next made the followof the State of origin in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings.
308. See text accompanying notes 287-91 supra.
309. This may be changed by statute. See, e.g., the Canadian Uniform
Foreign Judgments Act, in PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM TY OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 86-89 (1933),

under which the foreign

court must have had jurisdiction in personam [§ 3] which may not have been
established by extraterritorial service.
310. 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
311. Consol. Rules of Prac. of Ontario § 25(1)(b).
312. 236 F. Supp. at 293.
313. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
314. 236 F. Supp. at 294.
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ing determinations with respect to the Ontario proceeding: that
the Ontario statute authorized the Ontario court to take personal
jurisdiction over an absent defendant on the facts of this case; and
that the Ontario court's assumption of jurisdiction was a proper
exercise of judicial power. In making the latter finding the court
observed that the jurisdiction of foreign courts is measured by
United States standards. 15 Those standards are the same as applied to sister state judgments:
[S]everal courts in this country have held that the judisdiction of a foreign country to render a judgment against United
States citizens and corporations must be determined under
the same standards applied to a judgment of one state in this
country sought to be enforced in another.3 16
After discussing leading American cases and applying the
standards they prescribed, the court noted Ontario's strong interest in providing its citizens with an effective remedy, and concluded:
Therefore, all the requirements for in personam jurisdiction under United States concepts of due process are present in this case, and the assumption of such jurisdiction over
the defendant by the Supreme Court of Ontario would not,
in the opinion of this Court, offend "traditional notions of
'8 17
fair play and substantial justice.
The court accordingly enforced the Ontario judgment. The result
of this case is especially interesting since Ontario borders all of
the Great Lakes, where most pollution actions are likely to arise.
315. The court stated:
Therefore, this Court feels that in the interest of affording United
States citizens a reasonable degree of certainty as to when our own
Courts will, under principles of comity, enforce a judgment rendered
against such citizens in foreign countries, the issue of whether the foreign country had jurisdiction over the United States national should be
determined by our own standards of judicial power as promulgated by
the Supreme Court under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
236 F. Supp. at 296, applying International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), as
qualified by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
316. 236 F. Supp. at 296, citing Compagnie Du Port De Rio De Janeiro v.
Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163 (S.D. Me. 1927); Pope v. Heckscher, 260
N.Y. 114, 194 N.E. 53 (1934), 97 A.L.R. 687; Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426,
37 P.2d 1069 (1934).
317. 236 F. Supp. at 298 (1964). See also Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (C.C.N.Y. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d 896 (App. Term 1967).
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This holding indicates that a United States court could ex-

tend recognition to and enforce an Ontario ex parte judgment, or
that of another province based on a similar statute, against an
American defendant granting damages for pollution injury. The
court would, of course, have to satisfy itself that the Canadian
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant to render a
judgment in personam against him and that the standards laid
down in the United States Supreme Court cases l8 are apposite
to a pollution situation. While there appear to be no United

States decisions applying the Supreme Court's judicial power
standards to a case in which foreign pollution caused injury in the
forum, the application of these standards in other cases3 19 and
their underlying rationales2 ° strongly indicate that a court could
21
find them appropriate.3

The method of testing foreign judgments followed in Cherun
appears to be generally accepted in the United States32 2 except
2
that the court's quotation of the reciprocity language in Ritchie
seems unnecessary since "[t]here is question whether considera13 24
Four states, California,3 25
tions of reciprocity are material.
Illinois, 2 6 Maryland, s2 7 and Oklahoma3 2 8 have adopted the Uni318. See note 315 supra.

319. See, e.g., Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231
(9th Cir. 1969).
320. See text accompanying notes 255-67 supra.
321. See text accompanying notes 271-76 supra. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
See recognition of Foreign
Nation Judgments, comment d, stating that whether an otherwise valid default
judgment will be recognized depends in part upon the kind of judgment involved.

If the judgment is not in rem or quasi-in-rem, it
will usually be recognized provided that the foreign court had jurisdiction, that the defendant was given adequate notice and adequate opportunity to be heard and that [the conditions stipulated in Hilton v. Guyot]
were satisfied ...
It is possible that a given basis of jurisdiction, such as the doing of an
act or the causing of consequences in a state . . .might not meet the

requirements of a particular State of the United States for the recognition of a foreign nation judgment even though the given basis did meet
the requirement of due process . . . and under the rules of competence
of the particular State . . . would authorize an assumption of jurisdic-

tion in a similar case by the courts of that state.
Id. at 299.
322. See id. at § 98.
323. See text accompanying note 314 supra.
324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, comment e (1971).
325. CAL.CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 1713 (West Supp. 1972).
326. Smith-Hurd Act ch. 77, §§ 121-129.
327. CODE art. 35, §§ 53-A to 53-I (1957).
328. OKiA. STAT.ANN.tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (1965).
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form Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act (1962)829
which generally embodies the United States common law rule."' °
The United States itself is not presently a party to any similar
agreement presumably because such would involve regulating state
court practice.3" 1
2. Canada-Canadianrequirements for recognition of foreign money judgments, as reflected in Commonwealth case law,
have evolved considerably in the last century. While it was formerly true that there was no assurance of recognition of a foreign
judgment simply because a Commonwealth court would have
taken jurisdiction under like circumstances,3 3 2 the point has
been reached that an English decision can say, "surely. . .what
entities an English court to assume jurisdiction must be equally efMoreover, authority
fective in the case of a foreign court. ' 33
has it that a lack of reciprocity in enforcement is not a defense
at common law, and this rule holds throughout the common law
provinces of Canada. 3 4 To be sure, the situation is somewhat
complicated by the fact that at least two Provinces 3 have adopted
the Canadian Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 36 under which
in personam jurisdiction may not be established pursuant to extraterritorial service. Further, three provinces 3 7 allow reopening
of the merits.33 8
329. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AcT, 9B UNIFORM
Massachusetts has a statute modeled on the Act.
LAws ANN. 64-69 (1962).
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 235 § 23A. See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (1957).
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Reporter's Note
(1971). Section 1713.4 of the California version of the Uniform Act states as
follows:
Grounds for non-recognition
(b)

A foreign judgment need not be recognized if

(6) In the case of jurisdiction based only upon personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for trial of the action.
CAL. CODE OF Cwr. PRO. § 1713.4 (West Supp. 1972).
331. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 106,

at 700-04.
332. See Schisby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
333. Travers v. Holley, [1953] P. 246, 256 (C.A. 1953).
334. See Kennedy, Recognition of Judgments in Personam: The Meaning of
Reciprocity, 35 CAN. B. REV. 123 (1957).
335. New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. Id. at 144.
336.

PROCEEDINGS, CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORMITY

86-89 (1933).
337. Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
note 334.
338. Id.

OF

LEGrSLA-

nON IN CANADA
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As in the United States, it appears that a foreign judgment
will generally be recognized by Canadian courts when the jurisdictional basis for the judgment is comparable to one allowable in
Canada. The English case of Travers v. Holly139 illustrates this
point. Plaintiff there obtained an ex parte divorce decree from a
New South Wales court, which was sought to be enforced in England. The statute upon which jurisdiction over defendant was
based was similar, although not identical, to an English statute
under which a divorce action could have been maintained on related facts. An English court could not, however, have entertained the action at common law. Applying what has been termed
jurisdictional "reciprocity,"3 4 the court stated in one opinion:
"On principle it seems to me plain that our courts in this matter
'341
should recognize the jurisdiction which they themselves claim.
3. Summary-The conclusion may be drawn from the principles discussed above that as between Canada and the United
States, service of process pursuant to a forum statute upon an ab34 2
sent defendant which was valid by the standards of the forum
to confer in personam jurisdiction would not be used as the basis
for withholding recognition from, or denying enforcement to a
judgment from the other country. To be sure, this proposition is
by no means settled, especially in view of the fact that "[s]ervice
of judicial process out of the jurisdiction is necessarily prima facie
an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty
of the foreign power where service is effected . . . ,,14' But the
currently perceived obligation on the part of states to prevent or
indemnify harmful foreign consequences of pollution from within
their borders 2 "4 is a strong argument in favor of enforcing foreign
339. [19531 P. 246 (C.A. 1953), cited approvingly by the House of Lords in
Indyka v. Indyka, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 510 (1967).
340. See Kennedy, supra note 334, at 125.

341. [19531 P. at 250-51. See also A. DIcEY & J. MomRS, supra note 119,
at 796:
The most fundamental of all requirements for the recognition or

enforcement of a foreign judgment in England . . . is that the foreign court should have had jurisdiction according to the English rules
of the conflict of laws.
342. Both countries require validity by their own standards, but the similarity of the standards used in each country would suggest that proper jurisdiction in one country would be found proper by the standards of the other. See
text accompanying notes 306-09 supra.
343. Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. 1952).
344. As to the responsibility of the nation itself, see, e.g., Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
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judgments which hold the polluter responsible for the foreign consequences of his activity. This is particularly true in light of the
recent United Nations General Assembly vote, without opposition, 4 5 to support Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 46 concerning the responsibility
of states to prevent extraterritorial pollution damage34 7 and develop "the international law regarding liability and compensation
for the victims of pollution . . . ." from extraterritorial sources.34
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has endeavored to demonstrate that it is jurisdictionally possible for Canadians and Americans to bring actions
against foreign sources of trans-boundary pollution. The case law
and statutes considered above indicate that there would always be

a potential jurisdictional avenue available to a plaintiff in either
country. A Canadian plaintiff would have more possibilities from
which to choose because, in addition to the rights of action available to him under United States state and federal statutes, he could
bring an action in the United States for injury to his land. Such
a suit in Canada by an American would be precluded by the Canadian local action rule. Actions at the place of the injury appear
283 (1970); Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of
International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189 (1965); Bleicher, An Overview
of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9-75 (1972);
Lee, International Legal Aspects of Pollution of the Atmosphere, 21 U. TORONTO
LJ. 203 (1971); Bourne, InternationalLaw and Pollution of International Rivers
and Lakes, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 193 (1971); Fischerhof, Liability in National
and International Law for Damage Through Water Pollution, in ASPECTS OF
WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL

(WHO Public Health Papers No. 13,

1962);

Lester, supra note 4; Jencks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURs 105,
121-26 (1966); 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 23, at 1040-50.
345. G.A. Res. 2996, 27th sess., 15 Dec. 1972. The recorded vote was 223
in favor, none against, with 10 abstentions.
346. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1.
Reprinted in IX U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE No. 7 (July, 1972).
Those principles state as follows:
21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
22. States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction
or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
347. Id. principle 21.
348. Id. principle 22.
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possible under the narrow conditions postulated for analytical purposes; if defendant conducted even minimal business activities in
the jurisdiction where the injury occurred-which would often be
the case-a court would probably be far more willing to require
him to appear, even though plaintiff's injury did not "arise out" of
such activities, at least in the usual sense. An assessment of
whether plaintiff will succeed must be made on a case by case
basis. But it can be said, at least, that the courts' doors are open.
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